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ABSTRACT
Industrialization in Thailand has led to a rapid growth of the 
manufacturing sector, relative to other sectors. The overall growth rate 
of the economy during the last 25 years has been impressively high, and 
substantial structural changes have taken place. However the traditional 
agricultural sector has been affected adversely by the growth process.
This study examines some of the economic factors that have
contributed to the past growth of the Thai economy and attempts to
analyse, in a general equilibrium approach, the impact of exogenous shocks 
on the agricultural sector. Expansion of cultivable land in the past 
assisted the crop diversification program and in the expansion of 
agricultural production. The rapid growth of the manufacturing sector has 
tended to cause some upward pressure on real wages and attracted labour 
from agriculture. The price policy pursued by the government has had an 
urban bias and discriminated against agriculture while the manufacturing 
sector received assistance from the industrial protection policy. The 
recent deterioration in the terms of trade, together with the fixed 
exchange rate policy, has tended to enhance the adverse effects on the 
agricultural sector.
The findings of this study supports the view that a policy change 
towards trade liberalization should lead to more efficient use of 
resources in the economy and benefit agriculture. It should be noted, 
however, that the model used in the analysis does not incorporate 
unemployment and technological change and the impact of a change in the
terms of trade is only partially analysed. Despite the limitations of
Vthis model, the results indicate the potential of this type of modelling
exercise.
ABBREVIATIONS
CGE Computable General Equilibrium
EEC European Economic Community
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
ha hectares
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICOR Incremental Capital Output Ratio
IMF International Monetary Fund
NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board
OAE Office of Agricultural Economics
U. S. United States
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Thailand has long been known as an agricultural country.
Industrialization in the Thai economy effectively began in the early 1960s 
and, since then, the countrv has shown impressive growth. The nation, as 
a whole, has experienced very high growth rates in real GDP during the
past t'-’O decades. The 1960-1984 annual average growth rate in real GDP
was 7 per cent per annum. In spite of the crises caused by the 1973-1974 
and the 1977-1981 oil price shocks, the real GDP growth rate was as high 
as 8 per cent per annum between 1975-1979 and 5.6 per cent per annum
between 1979-1984. This rapid growth has brought about a very significant 
restructuring of the economy. The share of agriculture in real GDP has 
declined (from 40% in 1960 to 23% in 1984) while manufacturing and service 
sectors have become more important. Diversification has taken place in 
most sectors and there have been high export and employment growth rates. 
Pakkasem (1983, p.1) argued that
Thailand's economic development should be viewed as a 
transition to modern forms of economic organization, rather than 
just a traditional view of economic expansion.
Despite the rapid rate of industrialization, agriculture has been 
growing steadily in absolute terms. Rice has long been the dominant 
agricultural product. During the last 25 years, however, substantial 
progress has been made in the diversification of crop production. New 
commercial (non-traditional) crops, such as maize, cassava, sugar cane and 
kenaf, are now grown and the output mainly exported. But rice (traditional
crop), which is both the staple food and an export crop, still covers over
2half the cultivated area in Thailand. A substantial tax on rice exports, 
known as the rice premium, has depressed the domestic rice price below 
international prices. This has probablv acted as an incentive in promoting 
the cultivation of other crops. Increases in crop production have been 
mainly the result of an expansion of the cultivation into reserve land. 
Since the end of the 1970s such expansion has reached its limit and the 
land frontier has been closed. Yields of major crops, show no significant 
or consistent upward trends. The growth rate of agriculture, which 
averaged (in real terms) over 5 per cent per annum between 1960-1979, fell 
to less than 3.5 per cent per annum between 1979-1984. This indicates that 
future production gains will need to come from the intensification of crop 
cultivation and improvements in technology.
1.1 Objectives of the Study
The rapid expansion of Thai agriculture took place in a policy
environment characterized by a significant urban bias. High levels of
industrial protection and discriminatorv trade policies impacting on the 
agricultural sector were pervasive features of government policy during 
the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, the development of roads and 
other infrastructural facilities (facilitated by the U.S. war effort in 
Vietnam) made substantial areas of new land accessible and cultivable. 
This coincided with the rapid expansion in world demand for products such 
as maize and tapioca. Some explanations of Thai economic growth are in 
accordance with the "vent for surplus" model popularized by Myint (1958). 
The relative importance of exogenous factors and government policies in 
the economic development of the country remains to be analysed in a
rigorous way. In this study, we hope to make a start in this direction
using a general equilibrium approach.
Specifically, this study attempts to analyse, in a general 
equilibrium framework, the impact of various exogenous and policy changes
3on the agricultural sector, taking account of the impact of inter- and 
intra-sectoral changes that have taken place since 1970. The study will 
focus largely on the crop production component of the agricultural sector, 
which forms the largest share of agricultural production in the Thai 
economy.
1.2 Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 describes the characteristics and structural changes in the 
Thai economv over the past 20-25 years and discusses some government 
policies and policy changes during that period. This is followed by a 
discussion of the recent performance of major crops grown in the country 
and their relative importance in the nation's exports.
In chapter 3, a general equilibrium framework is developed. The 
impact of structural changes in the Thai economy on agriculture is then 
discussed in this context, including the impact of increased cultivable 
land endowment, government policies and changing terms of trade.
A simple computable general equilibrium model for Thailand is 
developed in chapter 4 to analyse, quantitatively, the intersectoral 
impact of the changes identified in chapter 3. The description of the 
model, its assumptions and data base, and experiments performed with this 
model are discussed. This is followed by a summary of results and 
conclusions.
Chapter 5 concludes this study with (1 ) the implications drawn for 
future policies; and (2) limitations of the study.
4CHAPTER 2
OVERVIEW OF THE THAI ECONOMY : 1960-1984
General background of the Thai economy is given in section 2.1. We 
present the overview of economic growth and structural changes of the Thai 
economy since 1960 in sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. Section 2.4 
summarizes the growth pattern during the past two decades. Since 
implications of the structural changes on the crop component of 
agricultural sector is the concern of this study, we conclude this chapter 
with the discussion in section 2.5 on recent performance of rice, rubber, 
sugar cane, maize and cassava which, at present, are the most important 
crops and export items of Thailand.
2.1 General Background
Thailand is a country in Southeast Asia, bordered by Malaysia and the 
sea to the south, Burma to the West and North, Laos to the North and 
Northeast and Kampuchea to the Northeast and East. It is divided into 4 
geographic regions with different cultural and socio-economic features; 
i.e. the plain and lowland Central Region, the rolling semi-arid 
Northeastern Region, mountainous Northern Region and the Peninsular 
isthmus Southern Region. It has a monsoon climate with ample rainfall, 
causing frequent floods in the North, Northeast and Central Regions. The 
mid-year population in 1984 was estimated at 50.04 millions.
There are significant contrasts in the level of development achieved 
in different regions. The 1979 per capita income (NESDB estimate) was, in 
terms of US dollars, 317 for Bangkok Metropolis, 771 for the most fertile
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6Central Region, 554 for the Southern Region, 383 for the Northern Region 
and 218 for the poorest Northeast Region. Thus the Bangkok per capita 
income in 1979 was over 6 fold that of the Northeast Region. As pointed 
out by Muscat (1966, p.28),
The failure of large inland areas to participate in the general 
level of development of the country to a significant extent was 
due primarily to the simple fact of physical isolation: they were 
not connected with the engine of growth, international trade, 
which was propelling the rest of the economy, while the absence of 
any deliberate government policy to stimulate development in these 
regions meant that there was no 'outside' economic force capable 
of breaking the low productivity - low income - low investment 
circle in which these areas were bound.
Recently government policies have shifted from the sole emphasis on the 
overall growth of the economy to greater concern with the problems of 
rural poverty and economic inequality, as stressed in the objectives of 
the present National Plan (The Fifth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan 1982-1986, NESDB 1981, pp.2-3).
2.2 Economic Growth
The Thai economy has experienced an impressive growth rate during the 
past few decades. Table 2-1 below shows that the average real GDP growth 
rates in the 1960s and the 1970s were almost 8 and 7 per cent per annum 
respectively. They declined during 1980-1984 to an average 5.6 per cent 
per annum. Non-agricultural sectors, in particular manufacturing and 
services, have been growing at much higher rates than agriculture for the 
corresponding periods. Crop production has been growing steadily at a 
somewhat declining rate, averaging at 4.5 per cent per annum during 
1960-1984.
As seen in Table 2-2 per capita GNP grew quite rapidly, despite a 
high population growth rate during 1960-1980, in recent years both these 
rates have declined. The growth potential of the Thai economy increased
remarkably during the 1960s and public capital formation contributed
7Table 2-1: Average Growth Rate of GDP at Constant 1972 Prices
(% p.a.)
Sectors 1960-70 1970-80 1980-84 1960-84
1. Agriculture 5.5 4.2 3.7 4.7
Crops 4.9 4.3 4.1 4.5
Livestock 3.3 6. 1 4.4 4.6
Fisheries 20.1 2.3 2.7 9.5
Forestry 4.0 1.7 -2.4 1.9
2. Non-agriculture 9.3 8.0 6.1 8.2
Mining 11.2 6.3 2.0 7.6
Manufacturing 10.7 10.0 6.1 9.7
Services 8.8 7.4 6.3 7.8
GDP 7.9 6.9 5.6 7.1
Source : calculated from NESDB, National Income
of Thailand, various issues
mainly 1to transport and irrigation (see Silcock 1970 , p.169). The average
annual growth rate of gross fixed capital formation , at constant prices,
was 14 per cent between 1960-1970, declining to 6 per cent between
1970-1980 and to only 0..4 per cent between 1980- 1984. The shar-e of
capital formation in real GDP rose from 15,.4 per cent in 1960 to as high
as 28.2 per cent in 1969 but has declined somewhat in recent years to 20
per cent in 1984 (see Table II.3 in Appendix II).
It is argued that the stability of Governments, their continuous 
adherence to 'laisser-faire' economic policies and development through 
private initiative, and their success in maintaining a climate suitable 
for private foreign investment were some of the i~portant factors behind 
Thailand's admirable performance in the 1960s (see Marzouk 1972, p.19).
During the 1970s there were some signs that domestic political problems 
may have disrupted this environment.
8Table 2-2: Population and per capita GNP of Thailand,
Selected Years
(a)
Estimated 
Year mid-year
population
(millions)
(b)
per capita 
GNP in 
1972 prices 
(baht)
1960 26.39 2,584
1970 36.22 (3.2 %) 4,043 (4.6 %)
1980 46.46 (2.5 %) 6,126 (4.6 %)
1984 50.40 (2.1 %) 6,875 (2.9 %)
Source : (a) United Nations, Demographic Yearbook,
various issues
(b) NESDB
Note : figures in parentheses represent average
annual growth rate fron the preceeding year.
2.3 Structural Changes
The rapid growth of manufacturing has brought about substantial 
structural changes in the Thai economy. Agriculture's share in GDP 
declined significantly from 40 per cent in 1960 to 23 per cent in 1984, 
while manufacturing increased its share in GDP from 12 per cent to 21 per 
cent and services from 46 per cent to 54 per cent for the corresponding 
years (Table 2-3).
Although the agricultural sector has been shrinking in terms of its 
share in GDP, it is still a major sector in the Thai economy. More than 
two-thirds of the total population find their livelihood in agriculture. 
In the early 1980s the agricultural labour force constituted over 70 per 
cent of the total labour force and agriculture provided some 65 per cent
of the country's total exports while agricultural imports accounted for
Table 2-3: Structure of GDP at Constant
1972 Prices, Selected Years
(%)
Year Agri. Mining Mf g. Servs. GDP
1960 40.2 1.2 12.0 46.6 100.
1961 39.4 1.3 12.5 46.8 100.
1962 39.2 1.3 13.0 46.5 100.
1965 36. 1 1.7 14.3 47.9 100.
1966 36.6 1.8 14.2 47.4 100.
1967 33. 1 1.9 14.9 50. 1 100.
1970 32.2 1.7 15.5 50.6 100.
1971 32.2 1.8 16.0 50.0 100.
1972 30.3 1.8 16.9 51.0 100.
1975 30.5 1.2 18. 1 50.2 100 .
1976 29.8 1.3 19.2 49.7 100.
1977 27.6 1.5 20.3 50.6 100.
1980 24.9 1.6 20.7 52.8 100.
1981 25.0 1.5 20.7 52.8 100.
1982 24.2 1.4 20.8 53.6 100.
1983 23.7 1.3 21 . 1 53.9 100.
1984 23.2 1.4 21.2 54.2 100.
Source : calculated from NESDB, National Income 
of Thailand, various issues
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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some 12 per cent of the total imports. The availability, until recent 
vears, of large land areas suitable for cultivation encouraged extensive 
farming and raised labour-productivity. The agricultural sector has been 
growing steadily and has generally performed well in increasing 
production, as reflected in its substantial contributions to GDP and 
exports.
Muscat (1966, pp.56-57) argued that the shift in the economic
structure of the Thai economy during the early 1960s, in which agriculture 
was declining relative to secondary and tertiary industries, resulted from 
a slowing down in the relative rate of growth in agriculture. This 
sluggishness, he claimed, reflected technological stagnation, low and 
declining per capita productivity and utilization of all available natural 
flood land (where the risk of excessive flooding is not high). The yields 
of major crops during the past two decades have been relatively unchanged 
and the exhaustion of frontier land has become a constraint in recent
years to raising agricultural production. This argument appears to have 
some validity today.
It is likely that these were not the only factors, however. With
higher per capita income levels, consumer demand patterns have also 
changed. The shares of expenditure on manufactured goods and various 
services have been rising during 1960-1984 as can be seen from Table 2-4. 
This suggests that an expansion of the domestic market for these goods and 
services encouraged expansion of these sectors. The demand for services, 
in particular, could only be met by an expansion of that sector, as 
services are generally non-traded.
Thailand has participated actively in foreign trade, the openness of 
the economy is apparent, as indicated by the share of exports plus imports 
in GNP shown in Table 2-5, which varied between 0.30 - 0.48 during
1960-1983; and the economy has become more open during the last 10 years.
The rapid growth in income during the past few decades has been
Table 2-4: Share of Private Consumption Expenditure
at Constant 1972 Prices, by Commodity Group
(%)
1960 1970 1980 1984
Food 52.1 45.3 35.4 34.0
Beverages 3.7 5.7 9.2 8.8
Tobacco 3.6 3.5 4.3 3.7
Clothing & personal effects 7.7 8.9 9.4 9.0
Rent & water charges 5.8 4.4 3.6 3.7
Fuel & light 3.8 3.8 3.2 3.2
Furniture & household equip. 1.8 3.5 4.3 4.6
Household operation 1.9 2.2 2. 1 2. 1
Health expenses 5.5 5.8 7.6 8.8
Transp. & Communication 6.3 7.3 8.3 9.0
Recreation & Entertainment 6.4 8.2 11.1 11.2
Miscellaneous services 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.8
Total private consumption 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source : NESDB
Table 2-5: External Transactions 
as Percentage of GNP
(%)
Year
1
Exports Imports
1
Exports
plus
Imports
2
Exports
minus
Imports
1960 15.6 17.9 33.5 -1.9
1961 16.5 17.5 34.0 -0.5
1962 14.5 18. 1 32.6 -3. 1
1963 13.8 18.8 32.7 -4.6
1964 16. 1 19. 1 35.2 -2.6
1965 15.0 19.2 34.2 -3.8
1966 13.6 25.0 38.6 -10.9
1967 12.7 20.5 33.2 -7.4
1968 11.1 20.6 31.7 -8.9
1969 10.9 20.9 31.8 -9.4
1970 10.4 19.8 30.2 -9.0
1971 1 1.5 18.5 30.1 -6.6
1972 13.2 18.8 31.9 -5. 1
1973 14.4 19.5 33.9 -4.6
1974 18. 1 23.5 41.6 -5.0
1975 15.9 22.4 38.3 -6.2
1976 17.9 21.7 39.6 -3.6
1977 18.0 24. 1 42.1 -5.9
1978 17.5 23.4 40.9 -5.6
1979 19.5 21.7 46.2 -7.0
1980 19.4 28.8 48.2 -9.0
1981 19.5 28.7 48.1 -8.6
1982 19. 1 24. 1 43.1 -4.5
1983 15.8 24.2 40.0 -7.2
Source : Department of Customs and NESDB
1
Note : domestic products only
2
including re-exports
13
accompanied by good performance in exports. The annual average growth rate 
of export value between 1960 and 1982 was about 14 per cent and that of 
import value was about 15 per cent during the period. The structure of 
Thai industry during the 1960s was characterized to a significant extent 
by high import content , particularly of capital goods, since a good part 
of the industry was of the assembly type (see Marzouk 1972, pp.92-93 and 
Ingram 1971, p.280). To a degree this remains the case today, imports of 
capital goods accounted for 2 5 per cent of the total imports in 1982, 
compared with 31 per cent in 1965.
It is apparent from Table 2-6 that although the agricultural balance 
of trade has shown a rising surplus during 1960-1983, the total 
merchandise balance of trade has shown a widening deficit over that 
period. Agricultural exports, which have formed the largest proportion of 
the country's total exports, were usually subject to wide fluctuations in 
the international prices of agricultural products. Table 2-7 reveals that 
the international terms of trade, which were relatively favourable to the 
Thai economy during most of the 1960s and the early 1970s, have 
deteriorated significantly since the mid 1970s due to the two rounds of 
the oil price increases during 1973-1974 and 1977-1981 and relatively low 
world price of the Thai agricultural exports for most years over the last
decade.
T a b l e  2 - 6 : B a l a n c e  o f  T r a d e
( M i l l i o n s  o f  B a h t )
B a l a n c e  o f  
T r a d e
A g r i c . B a l a n c e  o f  
T r a d e
Y e a r  1
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s B a l a n c e E x p o r t s I m p o r t s B a l a n c e
1960 8 , 6 1 4 9 , 6 2 2 - 1 , 0 0 8 7 , 6 5 7 2 , 7 3 5 + 4 , 9 2 2
1961 9 , 9 9 7 1 0 , 2 8 7 - 2 9 0 8 , 8 1 8 3 ,  138 + 5 , 6 8 0
1962 9 , 5 2 9 1 1 , 5 0 4 - 1 , 9 7 4 8 , 2 3 5 3 , 0 8 2 + 5 , 1 5 3
1963 9 , 6 7 6 1 2 , 8 0 3 - 3 , 1 2 6 8 , 3 1 0 3 , 1 0 8 + 5 , 2 0 2
1964 1 2 , 3 3 9 1 4 , 2 5 3 - 1 , 9 1 4 1 0 , 6 1 2 3 , 4 4 7 + 7 , 1 6 5
1965 1 2 , 9 4 1 1 6 , 1 8 5 - 3 , 2 4 5 1 0 , 8 6 0 3 , 4 3 7 + 7 , 4 2 3
1966 1 4 , 3 1 0 2 5 , 3 4 7 -1  1 , 0 3 7 1 1 , 7 4 7 3 , 9 4 2 + 7 , 8 0 5
1967 1 4 , 1 6 6 2 2 , 1 8 7 - 8 , 0 2 2 1 1 , 0 5 4 4 , 1 5 7 + 6 , 8 9 7
1968 1 3 , 6 7 9 2 4 , 1 0 3 - 1 0 , 4 2 4 1 0 , 5 0 4 4 , 2 3 1 + 6 , 3 0 9
1969 1 4 , 7 2 2 2 6 , 8 9 1 - 1 2 ,  169 1 1 , 0 3 6 4 , 2 0 5 + 6 , 8 6 1
1970 1 4 , 7 7 2 2 7 , 0 0 9 - 1 2 , 2 3 7 1 0 , 9 3 7 3 , 8 8 4 + 7 , 0 5 3
1971 1 7 , 2 8 1 2 6 , 7 9 4 - 9 , 5 1 3 1 2 , 4 7 0 3 , 8 5 5 + 8 , 6 1 5
1972 2 2 , 4 9 1 3 0 , 8 7 5 - 8 , 3 8 4 1 5 , 8 4 5 4 , 3 5 4 + 1 1 , 4 9 1
1973 3 2 , 2 2 6 4 2 , 1 8 4 - 9 , 5 5 8 2 2 , 6 2 9 5 , 3 3 9 + 1 7 , 2 9 0
1974 5 0 , 3 2 5 6 4 , 0 4 4 - 1 3 , 7 1 8 3 6 , 2 8 9 7 , 5 4 7 + 2 8 , 7 4 2
1975 4 8 , 4 3 8 6 6 , 8 3 5 - 1 8 , 3 9 8 3 3 , 7 5 0 8 , 7 3 8 + 2 5 , 0 1 2
1976 6 0 , 7 9 7 7 2 , 8 7 7 - 1 2 , 0 8 0 4 6 , 1 3 6 9 , 7 5 0 + 3 6 , 3 8 6
1977 7 1 , 1 9 8 9 4 , 1 7 7 - 2 2 , 9 7 9 5 1 , 8 3 1 1 2 , 9 8 5 + 3 8 , 8 3 6
1978 8 3 , 0 6 5 1 0 8 , 8 9 9 - 2 5 , 8 3 4 5 6 , 3 4 1 1 7 , 2 5 5 + 3 9 , 0 8 6
1979 1 0 8 , 1 7 9 1 4 6 , 1 6 1 - 3 7 , 9 8 2 7 2 , 0 5 8 2 0 , 2 5 5 + 5 1 , 8 0 3
1980 1 3 3 , 1 9 7 1 9 3 , 6 1 8 - 6 0 , 4 2 1 8 1 , 4 6 2 2 3 , 9 5 2 + 5 7 , 5 1 0
1981 1 5 3 , 0 0 1 2 1 9 , 0 2 6 - 6 6 , 0 2 5 1 0 1 , 4 9 2 2 7 , 8 1 4 + 7 3 , 6 7 8
1982 1 5 9 , 7 2 8 1 9 6 , 6 1 6 - 3 6 , 8 8 8 1 0 7 , 8 3 6 2 3 , 1 9 6 + 8 4 , 6 4 0
1983 1 4 8 , 6 0 3 2 1 7 , 9 7 9 - 6 9 , 3 7 6 9 5 , 9 8 5 2 7 , 6 8 0 + 6 8 , 3 0 5
S o u r c e :  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C u s t o m s
1
N o t e  : d o m e s t i c  p l u s  r e - e x p o r t s
Table 2-7: Trade Index and Terms of Trade
(1975=100)
Exports Imports Terms
Year ------------------------ -------------------------- of
Volume Unit Value Volume Unit Value Trade
value value
1960 36.3 52.8 19.2 28.5 46.2 13.2 114
1961 43.1 51.4 22.2 29.9 46.7 14.0 110
1962 41.9 50.5 21.2 35.7 43.9 15.7 115
1963 43.3 49.6 21.5 40.2 43.4 17.4 114
1964 54.6 50.1 27.4 44.7 43.4 19.4 115
1965 56.5 50.7 28.6 48. 1 43.8 21 . 1 116
1966 59.8 52.2 31.2 58.8 42.7 25.1 122
1967 60.6 51.9 31.5 70.7 42.5 30.0 122
1968 58.7 51.7 30.3 80.7 40.4 32.6 128
1969 61.0 53.6 32.7 88.7 39.5 35.0 136
1970 64.7 50.7 32.8 91.2 42.7 38.9 119
1971 84.2 45.5 38.3 76.7 45.0 34.5 101
1972 99.8 50.1 50.0 88.7 47.5 42.1 105
1973 93.2 76.8 71.6 109.8 55.5 60.9 138
1974 104.3 106.1 110.7 101.6 89.8 91.2 1 18
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
1976 139.4 97.3 135.6 105.0 105.6 110.9 92
1977 159. 1 99.4 158.1 124.1 113.5 140.9 88
1978 171.7 107.4 184.4 133.1 122.3 162.8 88
1979 187.1 128.4 240.2 154.7 141.5 218.9 91
1980 194.9 151.7 295.7 160.8 175.7 282.5 86
1981 223.8 151.9 340.0 161.3 201.2 324.5 75
1982 259.5 136.6 354.5 138.4 212.7 294.4 64
1983 232.9 139.6 325. 1 176.0 196.8 346.4 71
Source: Bank of Thailand
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2.4 Pattern of Growth
The Thai agricultural sector is now facing serious structural 
problems as additional areas suitable for cultivation have been exhausted, 
and the growth rate of agricultural production has been declining. 
Mongkolsmai (1983, p.15) illustrated that the total productivity in
agriculture was rising during the past two decades due mainly to the rapid 
increase in farm mechanization, nonetheless yields of major crops were 
rather low. These problems, together with growing population, call 
attention to the need for more efficient choice of production patterns and 
better use of resources. Furthermore, agricultural price policies (such 
as the rice premium) in stabilizing domestic prices, have kept the prices 
of farm products relatively low. These problems have also caused a
'supply deficiency' in exports, including agricultural exports. As 
Siamwalla (1975a, p.25) points out
The share of Thailand in total World trade of many export 
commodities has been small enough so that in all these cases, the 
major problem that is the limiting factor on export expansion 
appears as supply deficiency rather than as lack of foreign 
demand.
With regard to industrialization in Thailand, it has been argued that 
the pattern of industrial growth during the 1960s reflected the rapid 
increase in domestic demand rather than comparative advantages (see 
Akrasanee 1975, pp.275-276 and Marzouk 1972, p.202). The policy of import 
substitution (inward looking industrialization) through tariff protection, 
and industrial promotion policy including indirect subsidization of 
domestic production, which were emphasized in the 1960s, encouraged the 
development of industries with high import content. Exports of
manufactured goods had not been encouraged until the early 1970s, when 
taxes on exports were generally reduced and in some cases manufactured 
exports were actively promoted. Since 1977 there have been structural 
adjustments in manufacturing industries, particularly through business and
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excise taxes and import tariffs, with a strong trend towards export 
promotion (see Akrasanee and Ajanant 1983, pp.35-36).
Between 1964 and 1968 there was a rapid rise in United States 
military expenditure in Thailand in association with the Vietnam war. The 
service sector expanded significantly in response to the increase in 
demand from the military personnel coming for rest and recreation. 
Substantial excess capacity tended to emerge later in the service sector 
due to the phasing down of that military expenditure. However, this 
excess capacity in services did not create any serious problems as the 
increase in national income raised demand for some services. The service 
sector, in terms of its share in GDP, remained relatively unchanged during 
the 1970s (see Table 2-3), but has expanded in recent years, due probably 
to the rapidly growing tourist industry over the last decade.
2.5 Recent Performance of Major Crops
Within agriculture itself, production of crops has formed the largest 
share, between 71-78 per cent during 1960-1984 (see Table 2-8 below). 
During 1980-1984 average crop share in agriculture was 75.5 per cent, 
followed by livestock with 12.5 per cent, fisheries with 8.3 per cent and 
forestry with 3.7 per cent.
Thailand was essentially a one-crop (rice) economy, however, in 
recent decades substantial diversification in crop production has taken 
place. The need to develop a diversified agriculture for the Thai economy 
was perceived in the late 1950s, partly to avoid the risk of excessive 
dependence on a single crop and to provide a variety of raw materials for 
a growing economy (see Ingram 1971, p.257).
Siamwalla (1975a, p.36) pointed out the importance of large
investment in road building to the agricultural sector:
A new frontier opened up in the upland areas, where the malaria 
eradication program made these areas habitable for the first time. 
Unlike the paddy areas whose links to the outside world are
Table 2-8: Share of Crops in Agriculture at Constant 
1972 Prices, Selected Years
(%)
Year Rice Rubber
Sugar
cane Maize Cassava
Other
crops
All
Crops
1960 43.6 2.5 2.8 1.8 1.4 25.5 77.7
1961 44.0 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 24.4 77.3
1962 46.6 2.6 1.6 1.9 2.2 23.0 78.0
1965 40.4 2.5 1.7 2.8 1.4 27.3 76.0
1966 43.0 2.2 1.2 2.9 1.7 27. 1 78.2
1967 36.7 2.3 1.5 3.3 1.5 28.9 74. 1
1970 36.4 2.7 2.3 3.9 2.3 25.9 73.5
1971 35.0 2.8 2.0 4.8 2.6 25.9 73. 1
1972 30.8 3.0 3.2 2.6 3.2 29.2 72.0
1975 31.9 2.6 4.8 4.7 4.0 25.6 73.4
1976 29.6 2.7 6.2 4. 1 5.5 26.3 74.4
1977 27.8 2.9 4.3 2.6 6.7 27.2 71.5
1980 28.8 3.0 4. 1 4.3 8.0 26.2 74.5
1981 29.1 3.0 4.9 4.6 8.6 25.1 75.3
1982 28. 2 3.3 8.5 3.6 7.8 25.0 76.3
1983 29.4 3.4 5.7 4.3 8. 1 25.2 76.0
1984 28.2 3.4 5.9 4.7 8.4 24.7 75.4
Source : calculated from OAE, Agricultural Statistics 
of Thailand, various issues
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assured bv the age-old system of canals, the upland areas require 
links by road or rail. The rapid buildup of the highway network 
in the late 1950's and the early 1960's opened up vast areas for 
cultivation.
The progressive expansion of cultivation into new land, until recently, 
led to a rapid increase in the cultivation of upland crops such as maize, 
sugar cane and cassava. This seemed to be a response to external demand 
and these crops are now major export crops. Other important crops are 
rubber, coconut, kenaf, cotton, sorghum, groundnuts, soybean, vegetables 
and fruits. Diversification was, in some areas, limited by soil
conditions, availability of water supplies and labour.
Table 2-9: Average Growth Rates of Planted Area and
Production of Major Crops
(% per annum)
Rice Rubber Sugar Maize Cassava 
cane
A. Planted Area
1960-1970 2.4 10.2 -1 . 3 11.2 12.0
1970-1980 2.0 1.9 13.0 5.6 17.9
1980-1983 0.7 1.4 7.2 5.6 5.7
1960-1983 2.0 5.4 5.8 8.0 13.7
B. Production
1960-1970 3.7 8.4 2.5 13.5 10.9
1970-1980 1.3 1.9 11.2 4.5 17.0
1980-1983 3.2 8.5 6.3 5.8 4.7
1960-1983 2.6 5.5 6.7 8.5 12.7
Source : calculated from Tables 2-10 and 2-11
Area planted to rice during 1960-1980 expanded, from 5.9 million
hectares, producing less than 10 million tons in 1960, to 9.0 million
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hectares, producing over 15 million tons in 1980, despite the rapid growth 
of both area planted with and production of other crops. It is widely 
argued that there was also some shift from rice to other crops, 
particularly in the Central Plain, due to the higher profitability of 
other crops. Chuchard and Tosoonthorn (1959) showed that:
Net return in 1957 derived fron planting per rai”* of sugar cane 
was 241.7 baht, maize 113.9 baht, groundnuts 103.4 baht and rice 
5.6 baht.
The profitability of these other crops, in relation to rice, might have 
been reduced in recent years due to the sliding down in the 'rice premium' 
and suppressed world prices of the exports of crop products other than 
rice. To gain some insights about the problems in agriculture, recent 
performance of 5 major crops in the Thai economy, i.e. rice, rubber,
sugar cane, maize and cassava are reviewed below. Table 2-9 above shows
that the growth rates of area planted with and production of rice were 
much lower than the corresponding rates calculated for the other major 
crops.
2.5.1 Rice
Rice is both the staple food for domestic consumption and a major
export of Thailand. In fact it is the traditional crop and has been an
integral part of the economy for centuries. Although its share in 
agriculture has fallen substantially, from 44 per cent in 1960 to 28 per 
cent in 1984, rice cultivation is still the major occupation of Thailand 
and occupies over half of the cultivated area in the country.
Prior to World War II, rice trade, both international and domestic, 
was entirely free. The rice premium, which is a fixed tax per ton of rice 
exported varying with the grade of rice, was introduced in 1955. One 
stated objective has been the need to reserve sufficient rice for domestic
11 rai = 0.16 hectare
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consumption. The premium has also been used to stabilize the domestic 
price of rice at a relatively low level, in order to protect low-income 
urban consumers. The rice premium has been the subject of considerable 
controversy as Marzouk (1972, p.138) pointed out:
It has been criticized as being unfair to rice farmers, 
discouraging rice production and dampening down the purchasing 
power of the majority of people. On the other hand, its 
advantages in stabilizing domestic rice prices and in providing a 
source of budget revenue which is easy to collect are often 
stressed.
According to Usher (1978, p.24), one of the main effects of the rice 
premium is that "it perpetuates inefficient methods of rice farming by 
overpricing fertilizer, tractors, etc. in relation to rice". Chuchart and 
Tongpan (1965, p.2) made the criticism that "so long as all of the price 
risks are left for the farmers to bear, it is unreasonable to expect them 
to improve production, particularly when a large cash outlay is required".
The Government has argued that the proceeds of the rice premium are 
being returned to the agricultural sector in the form of irrigation 
projects, transportation facilities and agricultural extension activities, 
and that the abolition of the rice premium would simply increase the 
profits of middlemen. Chuchart and Tongpan (1965, p.65) concluded, on the 
basis of their study of the rice premium that "there is no evidence that 
the abolition of the rice premium would raise profits to middle-man 
merchants ... the existing competitive market will force the merchants to 
pay a higher price to farmers. This conclusion concurs with the
conclusions of Siamwalla (1978) that rice middlemen and other marketing 
related operators earned quite low margins, thus they had no monopoly 
power over farmers. Ingram (1971, p.258) coined the issue into a
development strategy:
Low domestic rice prices not only encourages agricultural 
diversification but also stimulates non-agricultural industries 
. . . low rice prices permit firms to pay lower money wages and thus 
to compete with imported goods. Low wages also encourage foreign
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capital inflows. The rice premium stimulates import substitution 
and the growth of new exports and thus contributes to the 
modernization of the Thai economy.
The rice premium is still a subject of vigorous debate. However many
studies (see, e.g. Siamwalla (1975b), Usher (1978), and Konjing and 
Issariyanukula (1985)) tend to suggest that abolition or reduction of the 
rice premium would raise the competitive position of Thai rice exporters 
in international markets, but the need for alternative sources of tax to 
make up the loss in government revenues still remains the issue. It must 
be noted, however, that the importance of the rice premium as a source of 
tax revenue has declined sharply, from about 9 per cent of total tax 
revenue during the latter half of the 1960s to only about 2 per cent of 
the total tax revenue in the early 1980s.
Other forms of government intervention in the Thai rice industry 
include:
- export licensing and occasional allocation of export quotas in 
order to regulate or stabilize rice exports;
- reserve requirement of rice stocks on the part of exporter for 
sales upon demand to the government at a fixed proportion to 
rice exports and at a low price in return for export privileges;
- farm price support through a government purchase program to 
maintain or even increase the farm gate price of rice.
2.5.2 Rubber
Rubber was the first crop to encroach upon the traditional dominance 
of rice in the Thai agriculture. It was introduced from Malaysia to
southern Thailand around 1901. But unlike Malaysia, where there was a
preference for large-scale estate development, the rubber industry in 
Thailand was characterized by small farms and the industry grew at a much 
lower rate. The main expansion of the planting in Thailand was stimulated 
by the high demand for rubber during World War II and the Korean War (see 
Silcock 1970, pp.41-43, and U.S. Department of Agriculture 1972, pp.
32-33). The area planted to rubber expanded at an average annual rate of
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over 10 per cent during the 1960s, but the rate fell to less than 2 per 
cent during 1970-1982. According to the information provided in EIU 
(1984, p.12), the growth on rubber production over the last 25 years was, 
initially, a result of new planting by smallholders, but latterly the 
sector has begun to reap the benefits of an extensive replanting scheme 
using high yielding stock and it is foreseen that the potential for
further products is high.
Area planted to rubber in Thailand reached 1.6 million hectares and 
production of about 0.58 million tons in 1982. Rubber became the second 
major export crop (after rice) until the mid 1970s; subsequently the
exports of sugar and tapioca products took its place (see Table 2-13).
Exports of rubber product could be considered another traditional export 
of the country. Unlike most agricultural exports, its response to world 
market conditions is constrainted by its lengthy planting period. 
Government intervention in the industry has been the tax imposed on the 
exports of rubber products and a replanting cessation.
International rubber prices fell during the 1960s, due to the
competition from synthetic rubber, but recovered somewhat during the 1970s 
in the aftermath of the oil price rise that has had adverse effects on 
synthetic rubber production and prices. Natural rubber has, thus, become 
a product with greater stability in supply than the synthetic substitute.
Although rubber tapping has been the main source of income for the 
majority of population in Southern Thailand, the recent development of the 
oil palm industry and its export performance appears to provide a good 
prospect for another source of income in the region. The latter involves 
less cost and the plant has shorter gestation period, so farmers can 
expect returns sooner than with rubber planting.
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2.5.3 Sugar cane
Until about 1950, Thailand was a net importer of sugar. Since then, 
"a remarkable expansion in production - aided and supported by the 
Government - has transformed Thailand into an exporter of sugar" (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 1972, p.43). A major problem in the sugar
industry has been excessive production. Pinthong and Siamwalla (1978, 
p.22) pointed out the political factor tending to encourage greater 
production:
The sugar industry in Thailand is very much involved with 
politics. Many sugar mills are run bv the politically powerful 
families. The sugar cane farmer is in general much richer and more 
politically organized than the rice farmers. Thus, many policies 
have been pushed which favour the sugar millers and sugar cane 
farmers. Eventhough, governments seem to understand the problem 
of overproduction, they still impose the policies which give 
incentive to the farmers to expand their cultivated land and 
produ ‘ ion.
From 1950 to 1971 area planted to sugar cane remained rather stagnant at 
around 0.14 million hectares with production around 4.9 million tons. A 
rapid expansion in the planted area took place between 1972-1977, reaching 
0.557 million hectares and production expanding to 18 million tons in 
1977. Both the planted area and the production of sugar cane fluctuated 
thereafter being 0.564 million hectares and of 22.8 million tons, 
respectively, in 1984.
Sugar policy has been designed to solve the short-run problems, with 
the objectives to clear the domestic market and stabilize domestic prices. 
A summary of sugar policy since 1960 is as follows:
- During 1960-1965, when the world price of sugar was low and 
there was a domestic surplus, the government subsidized sugar 
exports.
- During the 1961-1966 period government intenvention aimed at 
protecting the home market by imposing import tariffs (the 
proceeds of which were used to foster exports) or by completely 
banning sugar imports.
- During 1973-1974, when there was a shortage of sugar on the 
world market and the world price for sugar was high, the
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government imposed an export tax (sugar premium) in order to
stabilize the domestic price.
- Policy in recent years have been the concurrent direct 
subsidization of both consumer and producer prices. The 
government set a floor price for sugar cane at farm level and a 
ceiling consumer price for sugar during 1975-1982 and a fixed
income sharing ratio of 70:30 between sugar cane farmers and 
sugar millers.
The study by Konjing and Issariyanukula (1985, pp.142-143) indicates 
a very low market efficiencv for transmitting the price information from 
abroad to the domestic market, and they recommend that stronger 
competition in export trade of sugar should be encouraged through the
adoption of a policy that moves toward free trade.
2.5.4 Maize
"Maize is in many ways the most dramatic of all the 'miracle crops' 
that have developed since World War II to transform Thailand's rural
economy" (Silcock 1970, p.83). Maize was widely grown for domestic
consumption even before the war, its production rose more than 100 fold 
from the prewar annual average of 5 thousand tons to 544 thousand tons in 
1960 and has been increasing steadily since then. The planted area 
increased rapidly from 0.286 million hectares in 1960 to about 1.78 
million hectares in 1984. Estimated production was 4.1 million tons in 
1984.
There is no clearcut evidence as to whether maize output expansion 
was influenced by the taxes on rice (rice premium) . According to the 
evidence referred to by Silcock (1970, pp.89-90), rice needs more labour 
and water than maize. Even if labour were not a bottleneck, increased 
water requirements for rice cultivation might reduce the area that could 
be cultivated if rice were grown instead of maize.
Exports of maize increased rapidly at the average annual rate of 
about 13 per cent during 1960-1980, and constituted the second or third 
most important export crop until 1976, when exports of tapioca products
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began to take its place. The problems faced in the export trade of maize 
have been unstable markets, breach of contract and price undercutting. As 
the maize policy, in the past, did not encourage price competition, a free 
trade policy was adopted in 1981. According to Konjing and Issariyanukula 
(1985, p.141), "The mai^e market under a free trade policy proved
promissing ... [thus the policy] should be continuously pursued with 
emphasis on upgrading quality, better market facilities, and effective 
quality control".
2.5.5 Cassava
Another upland crop which has experienced remarkable growth in recent 
years is cassava. Its planted area expanded from 72 thousand hectares in 
1960 to about 1,405 thousand hectares in 1984, and the corresponding 
production increased from 1.2 to 20.0 million tons. In 1978 the export 
value of tapioca (cassava) products was as high as 10.9 billion baht, 
constituting 19.3 per cent of the total value of agricultural exports in 
that year, and took over for the first time the traditional position of 
rice as the top export crop of Thailand.
The growth of the cassava industry has been stimulated by the 
increasing external demand, mainly from the European Economic Community 
(EEC). However it has been anticipated that there was a distinct 
possibility that cassava exports might be restricted by an EEC import 
quota or a change in EEC tariff structure. The government, since 1980, has 
responded by introducing a policy aiming to reduce production and exports 
and stabilizing domestic prices. Konjing and Issariyanukula (1985, p.144) 
recommend that new markets should be searched for and a long-term strategy 
should be formulated to encourage cassava farmers to adopt alternative 
cropping systems which have better prospects.
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2.6 Summary
The trend in yields of each of the 5 major crops discussed above has 
been stagnant or declined somewhat during the period 1960-1982, total 
production grew primarily due to expansion in cultivated area. The rapid 
growth in the non-traditional export crops (such as maize, cassava and 
sugar cane) in relation to rice may have been influenced by the their 
relative prices in the world market. Table 2-18 shows that relative world 
prices of rice and sugar tended to favour rice production during most of 
the 1960s but reverted to favour sugar production afterwards, while 
relative world prices of rice and maize and of rice and tapioca products 
fluctuated a great deal and did not show any significant trend in favour 
of rice.
It can be seen in Table 2-2 0 that the relative farm prices of rice 
and sugar cane show a trend in favour of sugar cane during 1972-1983, 
while their relative world prices tended to favour rice production during 
the period. The relative farm prices of rice and maize show no obvious 
trend in favour of maize, while relative world prices tended to favour 
rice production during the period. This evidence tends to support the 
argument that the rapid expansion of competing crops with rice, especially 
sugar cane, was to a significant extent a result of the rice premium. The 
premium depressed the farm price of rice and discouraged its expansion, 
although world prices tended to favour rice production in relation to 
sugar and maize production. Mongkolsmai (1983, p.46) presents some
evidence on the protective coefficients which "show the distinct
disincentive against rice production, [however] a number of domestic
resource cost studies has shown that Thailand has the largest comparative
2see Akrasanee, N. and Wattananukit, A., 1976 "Comparative Advantage in 
Rice Production in Thailand", Food Research Institute Studies, Volume XV, 
No. 2, pp.177-212, and Limskul, K. , 1979 Comparative Advantage of the
Agricultural Sector in Thailand; A Study of Domestic Resource Cost of 
Rice, Maize, Cassava and Sugar, M. A. Thesis, Faculty of EconomicsT
Thammasat University, Bangkok
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advantage in rice production, particularly in the Central region. Cassava, 
sugar cane and maize rank second, third and fourth respectively in the 
degree of comparative advantage in production".
Corden and Richter (1967, p.149) referred to economic growth in 
Thailand, as represented by the expansion of rubber, maize, kenaf and 
cassava, as being export-led, and foreign trade, through the growing 
markets it has provided, as being an 'engine of growth'. Improved 
infrastructure, especially in road building and other transportation 
facilities in the 1960s, made new land accessible for the expansion of new 
crops. But exhaustion of new cultivable land in recent years has become a 
constraint to the further expansion of new crops. If agricultural exports 
are to continue to constitute the largest share of exports, and to assume 
the role of an ' engine of growth' in the Thai economy, increased yields 
will be necessary for raising agricultural production.
T a b le  2 - 1 0 :  A r e a  P l a n t e d  t o  P r i n c i p a l  C r o p s
( 1 , 0 0 0  h a )
Y e a r R i c e R u b b e r S u g a r
c a n e
M a i z e C a s s a v a
1960 5 , 9 2 2 481 158 286 72
1961 6 ,  179 493 124 307 99
1962 6 , 5 8 7 748 102 328 123
1963 6 , 5 9 7 824 149 418 140
1964 6 , 5 4 0 935 162 552 105
1965 6 , 5 5 4 941 141 577 102
1966 7 , 4 3 3 983 124 653 130
1967 6 , 6 5 8 1 , 1 8 2 150 662 141
1968 7 , 2 2 8 1 , 2 1 2 182 671 171
1969 7 , 5 8 4 1 , 2 4 4 118 680 191
1970 7 , 4 9 4 1 , 2 7 6 138 829 224
1971 7 , 5 2 7 1 , 3 0 8 140 1 , 0 1 9 221
1972 7 , 1 3 9 1 , 3 4 0 181 997 326
1973 8 , 0 3 7 1 , 3 7 2 25 9 1 , 148 436
1974 7 , 6 5 1 1 , 4 0 6 310 1 , 2 4 0 480
1975 8 , 5 1 9 1 , 4 0 6 391 1 , 3 1 2 594
1976 8 ,  137 1 , 4 6 0 499 1 , 2 8 5 692
1977 8 , 5 5 4 1 , 4 8 4 567 1 , 2 0 5 847
1978 9 , 3 4 6 1 , 5 0 8 510 1 , 3 8 6 1 , 1 6 5
1979 9 , 0 9 9 1 , 5 3 2 437 1 , 5 2 5 846
1980 9 , 1 0 1 1 , 5 3 8 468 1 , 4 3 4 1 , 1 6 0
1981 9 , 0 2 3 1 , 5 7 9 617 1 , 5 6 7 1 , 2 7 0
1982 8 , 9 8 7 1 , 6 0 0 583 1 , 6 7 9 1 , 2 0 6
1983 9 , 2 9 8 1 , 6 0 3 577 1 , 6 8 8 1 , 3 6 8
1984 8 , 8 6 7 564 1 , 7 8 0 1 , 4 0 5
S o u r c e  : OAE, A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  T h a i l a n d , 
v a r i o u s  i s s u e s
T a b l e  2 - 1 1 :  P r o d u c t i o n  o f  P r i n c i p a l  C r o p s
( 1 , 0 0 0  t o n s )
Y e a r R i c e R u b b e r S u g a r
c a n e
M a i z e C a s s a v a
1960 9 , 4 7 5 172 5 , 3 8 2 544 1 , 2 2 2
1961 9 , 8 8 6 186 3 , 9 8 4 598 1 , 7 3 6
1962 1 0 , 9 9 2 195 3 , 1 5 4 665 2 , 0 7 7
1963 1 1 , 5 8 5 198 4 , 7 3 3 858 2 , 1 1 1
1964 1 1 , 3 6 2 211 5 , 0 7 4 935 1 , 5 5 7
1965 1 0 , 9 7 8 217 4 , 4 8 0 1 ,0 2 1 1 , 4 7 5
1966 1 1 , 9 4 7 218 3 , 8 2 9 1 , 1 2 2 1 , 8 9 2
1967 9 , 6 2 5 21 9 4 , 5 2 6 1 , 3 1 5 2 , 0 6 2
1968 1 0 , 2 4 8 258 5 , 8 7 9 1 , 5 0 8 2 , 6 1 1
1969 1 3 , 4 1 0 282 5 , 1 0 2 1 , 7 0 0 3 , 0 7 9
1970 1 3 , 5 7 0 387 6 , 5 8 6 1 , 9 3 8 3 , 4 3 1
1971 1 3 , 7 4 4 316 5 , 9 2 6 2 , 3 0 0 3 , 1 1 4
1972 1 1 , 6 6 9 337 9 , 5 1 3 1 , 3 1 5 4 , 9 5 2
1973 1 3 , 8 8 6 368 1 3 , 3 3 9 2 , 3 3 9 5 , 6 6 8
1974 1 2 , 4 4 7 382 1 4 , 5 9 2 2 , 5 0 0 6 , 2 4 0
1975 1 4 , 0 9 2 349 1 9 , 9 1 0 2 , 8 6 3 8 , 1 0 0
1976 1 3 , 6 7 4 393 2 6 , 0 9 4 2 , 6 7 5 1 0 , 2 3 0
1977 1 2 , 3 3 5 431 1 8 , 9 4 1 1 , 6 7 7 1 1 , 8 4 0
1978 1 5 , 2 0 6 467 2 0 , 5 6 0 2 , 7 9 1 1 6 , 3 5 8
1979 1 4 , 6 4 6 534 1 2 , 8 2 7 2 , 8 6 3 1 1 , 1 0 1
1980 1 5 , 4 0 5 465 1 9 , 8 5 4 2 , 9 9 8 1 6 , 5 4 0
1981 1 5 , 7 5 8 508 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 , 4 4 9 1 7 , 7 4 4
1982 1 4 , 7 7 4 576 2 4 , 4 0 7 3 , 0 0 2 1 7 , 7 8 8
1983 1 6 , 9 4 3 594 2 3 , 8 6 9 3 , 5 5 2 1 8 , 9 8 9
1984 1 6 , 6 0 9 2 2 , 8 1 8 4 , 1 3 9 1 9 , 9 8 5
S o u r c e  : OAE, A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  T h a i l a n d ,
v a r i o u s  i s s u e s
Table 2-12: Yield of Major Crops
(100 kg/ha)
Year Rice
1
Rubber
Sugar 
cane 
( '000 
tons/ha)
Maize Cassava
1960 16.0 4.5 34. 1 19. 1 170.9
1961 16.0 4.7 32. 1 20. 1 173.7
1962 16.7 3.5 31.0 20.7 169.2
1963 17.6 3.6 31.7 22. 1 150.8
1964 17.4 3.6 31.3 17.2 148.3
1965 16.8 3.7 31.7 18. 2 144.8
1966 16.1 3.8 30.7 19.0 145.2
1967 14.4 3.6 30.2 22.0 146.4
1968 14.3 4.2 32.3 24.9 153.1
1969 17.7 3.8 43.2 25.0 161.3
1970 18.1 3.5 47.8 23.8 152.8
1971 18.2 3.4 42.5 22.5 140.6
1972 16.4 3.6 52.5 13.2 151.8
1973 17.2 2.9 51.6 20.4 130.0
1974 16.2 3.8 47.1 20.2 130.0
1975 16.6 3.5 50.9 21.8 136.2
1976 16.8 3.9 52.3 20.8 147.8
1977 14.4 3.9 33.4 13.9 139.8
1978 16.3 4.3 40.3 20. 1 140.4
1979 16. 1 3.8 29.4 18.8 131.2
1980 16.9 3.8 42.4 20.9 142.6
1981 17.4 4.0 48.9 22.0 139.7
1982 16.4 4. 1 41.8 17.9 143.9
1983 18.2 4.2 41.4 21 . 1 138.8
1984 18.8 41.8 23.2 142.2
Source : OAE, Agricultural Statistics of Thailand, 
various issues
1
Note Averaged by tappable area
Table 2-13: Share of Major Export Crops in Agricultural Exports
(%)
Tapioca Other Agric. 
Year Rice Rubber Sugar Maize Products Agric. Exports
1960 33.6
1961 40.8
1962 39.3
1963 41.2
1964 41.4
1965 39.9
1966 34. 1
1967 42.1
1968 35.8
1969 26.7
1970 23.0
1971 23.3
1972 28.0
1973 15.9
1974 27.0
1975 16.5
1976 18.6
1977 25.8
1978 18.5
1979 21.6
1980 23.9
1981 25.9
1982 20.9
1983 21.2
33.7 0.3
24.2 0.3
25.6 0.7
22.9 1.7
19.4 2.2
18.4 1.3
15.8 1.0
14.2 0.7
17.2 0.2
24. 1 0.7
20.6 1.3
15.3 3.7
11.8 8.6
20.2 5. 1
13.9 10.1
10.3 16.9
11.5 14.8
11.9 6.3
14.2 7.1
17. 1 6.8
15.1 3.7
10.6 9.4
7.0 12.0
12.4 6.7
7.2 3.8
6.8 5.1
6.3 5.1
10.3 5.3
13.1 6. 1
9.2 6.2
13.4 5.5
12.9 6.6
15.6 7.3
16.0 7.9
18.0 11.2
18.3 9.9
13.2 9.8
13. 1 11.2
11.4 10.6
16.6 13.6
12.1 16.3
6. 3 14.9
7.5 19.3
7.7 13.7
8.8 18.3
8.1 16. 1
7.6 18.3
8.9 16.2
21.5 100.0
22.9 100.0
22.9 100.0
18.6 100.0
17.8 100.0
24.9 100.0
30.2 100.0
23.5 100.0
23.8 100.0
24.5 100.0
26.0 100.0
29.4 100.0
28.8 100.0
34.4 100.0
21.9 100.0
26. 1 100.0
26.6 100.0
26.7 100.0
33.4 100.0
33.0 100.0
30.1 100.0
29.8 100.0
34.0 100.0
34.6 100.0
Source : Calculated from Tables 2-6 and 2-14
T a b l e  2 - 1 4 :  E x p o r t  V a l u e  o f  M a j o r  C r o p s
( M i l l i o n s  o f  B a h t )
Y e a r R i c e R u b b e r S u g a r M a i z e
T a p i o c a  O t h e r  
P r o d u c t s  A g r i c .
A g r i c . 
E x p o r t s
1960 2 , 5 7 0 2 , 5 7 9 27 551 288 1 , 6 4 2 7 , 6 5 7
1961 3 , 5 9 8 2 ,  130 27 599 44 6 2 , 0 1 7 8 , 8 1 8
1962 3 , 2 4 0 2 , 1 1 1 61 516 423 1 , 8 8 5 8 , 2 3 5
1963 3 , 4 2 4 1 , 9 0 3 138 857 43 9 1 , 5 4 9 8 , 3 1 0
1964 4 , 3 8 9 2 , 0 6 0 334 1 , 3 8 7 652 1 , 8 9 0 1 0 , 6 1 2
1965 4 , 3 3 4 1 , 9 9 9 138 1 , 0 0 3 676 2 , 7 0 9 1 0 , 8 6 0
196 6 4 , 0 0 1 1 ,8 6 1 1 17 1 , 5 7 6 644 3 , 5 4 8 1 1 , 7 4 7
1967 4 , 6 5 3 1 , 5 7 4 75 1 , 4 3 1 726 2 , 5 9 5 1 1 , 0 5 4
1968 3 , 7 7 5 1 , 8 1 6 16 1 , 6 4 7 773 2 , 5 1 3 1 0 , 5 4 0
1969 2 , 9 4 5 2 , 6 6 3 81 1 , 7 6 7 876 2 , 7 0 4 1 1 , 0 3 6
1970 2 , 5 1 7 2 , 2 5 0 140 1 , 9 6 9 1 , 2 2 3 2 , 8 3 9 1 0 , 9 3 7
1971 2 , 9 1 0 1 , 9 0 6 467 2 , 2 8 6 1 , 2 4 0 3 , 6 6 1 1 2 , 4 7 0
1972 4 , 4 3 7 1 , 8 6 2 1 , 3 5 6 2 , 0 8 6 1 , 5 4 7 4 , 5 5 7 1 5 , 8 4 5
1973 3 , 5 9 4 4 , 5 7 3 1,  161 2 , 9 6 9 2 , 5 3 7 7 , 7 9 6 2 2 , 6 2 9
1974 9 , 8 1 0 5 , 0 3 7 3 , 6 7 8 5 , 9 6 5 3 , 8 3 6 7 , 9 6 4 3 6 , 2 8 9
1975 5 , 5 8 1 3 , 4 6 7 5 , 6 9 6 5 , 6 1 5 4 , 5 9 4 8 , 7 9 7 3 3 , 7 5 0
1976 8 , 6 0 3 5 , 2 8 7 6 , 8 4 3 5 , 5 9 8 7 , 5 2 6 1 2 , 2 7 9 4 6 , 1 3 6
1977 1 3 , 3 8 3 6 ,  156 7 , 4 5 8 3 , 2 8 6 7 , 7 1 6 1 3 ,8 2 1 5 1 , 8 2 1
1978 1 0 , 4 2 4 8 , 0 2 2 3 , 9 8 4 4 , 2 3 1 1 0 , 8 8 9 1 8 , 7 9 0 5 6 , 3 4 1
1979 1 5 , 5 9 2 1 2 , 3 2 8 4 , 8 9 9 5 , 5 6 7 9 , 8 8 7 2 3 , 7 7 2 7 2 , 0 4 6
1980 1 9 , 5 0 8 1 2 , 3 2 4 2 , 9 9 3 7 , 2 0 1 1 4 , 8 8 1 2 4 , 5 4 8 8 1 , 4 5 4
1981 2 6 , 3 6 6 1 0 , 8 3 2 9 , 5 8 8 8 , 2 3 6 1 6 , 4 3 2 3 0 , 4 0 1 1 0 1 , 8 5 6
1982 2 2 , 5 1 0 7 , 5 7 6 1 2 , 9 5 6 8 , 2 3 1 1 9 , 7 3 4 3 6 , 6 0 1 1 0 7 , 6 0 7
1983 2 0 ,  100 1 1 , 7 3 9 6 , 3 2 5 8 , 3 8 6 1 5 , 3 7 0 3 2 , 7 8 6 9 4 , 7 0 6
S o u r c e  : OAE, A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  T h a i l a n d , 
v a r i o u s  i s s u e s
Table 2-15: Export Quantity of Major Crops
( 1 , 000 tons)
Year Rice Rubber Sugar Maize Tapioca
Products
1960 1,203 170
1961 1,576 185
1962 1,271 194
1963 1,418 187
1964 1,896 217
1965 1,895 211
1966 1,508 202
1967 1.482 211
1968 1,068 252
1969 1,023 276
1970 1,064 278
1971 1,581 308
1972 2,113 318
1973 849 391
1974 1,016 363
1975 906 332
1976 1,973 373
1977 2,946 401
1978 1,607 524
1979 2,797 520
1980 2,800 454
1981 3,032 473
1982 3,784 434
1983 3,543 522
67 515 270
92 569 443
91 484 401
90 768 240
86 1, 147 739
215 831 719
173 1,262 689
77 1 , 146 781
25 1,558 889
99 1,545 975
168 1,597 1,327
386 1,886 1 , 123
635 2,019 1,311
275 1,506 1,836
436 2,260 2,392
595 2,072 2,384CN*-X- 2,388 3,720
1,656 1,518 3,954
1,042 1,955 6,287
1,287 1,988 3,961
453 2, 175 5,218
1 , 120 2,547 6,266
2,208 2,801 7,816
1,526 2,646 5,199
Source : OAE, Agricultural Statistics of Thailand,
various issues
T a b l e  2 - 1 6 :  I m p l i c i t  E x p o r t  P r i c e  o f  M a j o r
C r o p  P r o d u c t i o n
( b a h t / t o n )
Y e a r R i c e R u b b e r
P r o d u c t s
S u g a r M a i z e T a p i o c a
P r o d u c t s
1960 2 ,  136 1 5 , 1 7 1 403 1 , 0 7 0 1 , 0 6 7
1961 2 , 2 8 3 1 1 , 5 1 4 293 1 , 0 5 3 1 , 0 0 7
1962 2 , 5 4 9 1 0 ,8 8 1 670 1 , 0 6 6 1 , 0 5 5
1963 2 , 4 1 5 1 0 , 1 7 6 1 , 5 3 3 1 , 1 1 6 1 , 8 2 9
1964 2 , 3 1 5 9 , 4 9 3 3 , 8 8 4 1 , 2 0 9 882
1965 2 , 2 8 7 9 , 4 7 4 642 1 , 2 0 7 940
1966 2 , 6 5 3 9 , 2 1 3 676 1 , 2 4 9 825
1967 3 , 1 4 0 7 , 4 6 0 974 1 , 2 4 9 817
1968 3 , 5 3 5 7 , 2 0 6 640 1 , 0 5 7 793
1969 2 , 8 7 9 9 , 6 4 9 818 1 , 1 4 4 660
1970 2 , 3 6 6 8 , 0 9 4 833 1 , 2 3 3 92 2
1971 1 , 8 2 9 6 , 1 8 8 1 , 2 1 0 1 , 2 1 2 1 , 1 0 4
1972 2 ,  100 5 , 8 5 5 2 , 1 3 5 1 , 0 3 3 1 , 1 8 0
1973 4 , 2 3 3 1 1 , 6 9 6 4 , 2 2 2 1 ,9 7 1 1 , 3 8 2
1974 9 , 6 5 6 1 3 , 8 7 6 8 , 4 3 6 2 , 6 3 9 1 , 6 0 4
1975 6 ,  160 1 0 , 4 4 3 9 , 5 7 3 2 , 7 1 0 1 , 9 2 7
1976 4 , 3 5 9 1 4 , 1 7 4 6 , 0 8 8 2 , 3 4 4 2 , 0 2 3
1977 4 , 5 4 3 1 5 , 3 5 2 4 , 5 0 4 2 ,  165 1 , 9 5 1
1978 6 , 4 8 7 1 5 , 3 0 9 3 , 8 2 3 2 , 1 6 4 1 , 7 3 2
1979 5 , 5 7 5 2 3 , 7 0 8 3 , 8 0 7 2 , 8 0 0 2 , 4 9 7
1980 6 , 9 6 7 2 7 , 1 4 5 6 , 6 0 7 3 , 3 1 1 2 , 8 5 3
1981 8 , 6 9 6 2 2 , 9 0 1 8 , 5 6 1 3 , 2 3 4 2 , 6 2 5
1982 5 , 9 4 9 1 7 , 4 5 6 5 , 8 6 8 2 , 9 3 9 2 , 5 2 7
1983 5 , 6 7 3 2 2 , 4 8 9 4 , 1 4 5 3,  169 2 , 9 5 9
S o u r c e  : C a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  T a b l e s  2 - 1 4  a n d  2 - 1 5
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T a b le  2 - 1 7 :  A v era g e  G rowth R a te s  o f  E x p o r ts  o f  M ajor C rop s
(% p e r  annum)
R ic e  R ubber S u g a r  M aize  C a ssa v a  
c a n e
A_. E x p o r t  V a lu e
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 0 - 0 . 2 - 1 . 4 1 7 . 9 1 3 . 6 1 5 . 6
1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 0 2 2 . 7 1 8 . 5 3 5 . 8 1 3 . 8 2 8 . 4
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 3 1 . 0 - 1 . 6 2 8 .  3 5 . 2 1.  1
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 3 9 . 4 6 . 8 2 6 . 8 1 2 . 6 1 8 . 9
B_. E x p o r t  Q u a n t i t y
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 0 - 1 . 2 5 .  1 9 . 6 1 2 . 0 1 7 . 3
1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 0 1 0 . 2 5 . 0 1 0 . 4 3 .  1 1 4 . 7
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 3 8 . 2 4 . 8 4 9 . 9 6 . 8 - 0 .  1
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 3 4 . 8 5 . 0 1 4 . 5 7 . 4 1 3 . 7
S o u r c e  : c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  T a b l e s  2 - 1 4  a n d  2 - 1 5
Table 2-18: Index of Relative World Prices of Rice and
Major Crop Products
(1970=100)
Year
Rice price 
to Sugar 
price
Rice price 
to Maize 
price
Rice price 
to Tapioca 
products' price
1960 187 104 78
1961 274 113 881962 134 125 94
1963 55 113 51
1964 21 100 102
1965 125 99 95
1966 138 111 125
1967 114 131 150
1968 194 174 174
1969 124 131 170
1970 100 100 100
1971 53 79 65
1972 35 106 69
1973 35 112 119
1974 40 191 235
1975 23 118 125
1976 25 97 84
1977 36 109 91
1978 60 156 146
1979 52 104 87
1980 37 1 10 95
1981 36 140 129
1982 36 105 92
1983 48 93 75
Source : Calculated from Table 2-16
Table 2-19: Farm Price of Major Crops
Year Rice
(baht/ton)
Sugar
cane
(baht/ton)
Maize 
(baht/kg)
1972 1,235.80 126.75 0.86
1973 1,955.10 187.34 1.35
1974 2,105.17 275.98 2.06
1975 1,947.84 288.10 1.86
1976 1,844.22 287.78 1.67
1977 2,322.84 287.91 1.64
1978 2,186.97 267.18 1.61
1979 2,609.28 387.31 2.09
1980 3,067.97 635.82 2.43
1981 2,836. 10 477.70 2. 18
1982 2,849.97 467.00 2.01
1983 2,824.00 342.14 2.40
Source : OAE, Agricultural Statistics of Thailand, 
Crop Years 1982/83 and 1983/84
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Table 2-20: Relative Price Index of Rice to Sugar cane and Maize
(1972=100)
Sugar cane Maize
Year Farm Export Farm Export
price price price price
1972 100 100 100 100
1973 107 100 101 105
1974 78 114 71 180
1975 69 66 73 111
1976 66 71 77 92
1977 83 103 98 103
1978 84 171 95 147
1979 69 149 87 98
1980 50 106 88 104
1981 61 103 91 132
1982 63 103 99 99
1983 85 137 82 88
Source : Calculated from Table 2-19
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE THAI ECONOMY
A brief review of literature of some of the models used to analyse 
the economic adjustment to exogenous shocks is presented in section 3.1, 
followed by a discussion, in section 3.2, on the analytical model used for 
studying the structural changes in the Thai economy, in a general 
equilibrium framework. We discuss, in section 3.3, the economic adjustment 
to certain government policies and exogenous shocks to the economy. 
Empirical evidence is provided, where possible, to supplement the 
analysis. And section 3.4 summarizes major conclusions of the analysis.
3.1 Review of Literature on Economic Adjustment to Exogenous Shocks
The main purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of exogenous 
factors and government policies, in terms of both their direct and 
indirect impacts on the agricultural sector, in the growth process of the 
Thai economv.
Analysis of the effects of the industrial protection policy, 
agricultural pricing policy in Thailand and seme exogenous shocks to the 
economy have been carried out in many studies (see, e.g. Akrasanee (1975), 
Puapanichya and Sriswasdilek (1981), Akrasanee and Ajanant (1983) and 
Panayotou (1985)). These studies usually emphasized only the direct 
effects of government policies and other changes, as they were based on a 
partial equilibrium approach. But indirect effects caused by the changing 
interrelationship of various sectors over time may also be important.
This study attempts to analyse both the direct and indirect effects of
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these major changes on the traditional agricultural sector using a general 
equilibrium approach.
During the 1970s, there has been a substantial growth of literature 
on the analysis of economic adjustment to exogenous shocks. The more 
recent literature has focussed on the general equilibrium effects of a
boom in a sector producing traded goods in an open economy. This is 
usually referred to as 'Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics'. 
Booming Sector models such as those discussed in Corden and Neary (1982) 
and Corden (1984), have generally been used to analyse the intersectoral 
effects of a boom industry, such as the discoveries of a new resource in 
an open economy. The cases usually discussed in the literature include
the adverse effects of the discoveries of natural gas in the Netherlands
on Dutch manufacturing, the North Sea Oil on British manufacturing and the 
minerals discoveries in Australia. However the basic analysis is 
applicable to many kinds of structural changes. The study 'Malaysian 
Structural Change and Its Impact on Rubber' by Barlow et at. (1985)
analyses, in this framework, the impacts of major changes in the Malaysian 
economy, such as the sudden emergence of the petroleum sector, the 
sustained expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors and the 
emergence of the palm oil as the main competing crop in the traditional 
rubber industry.
3.2 An Analytical Model of Structural Changes in Thailand
Although there has not been an obvious sudden boom in any sector of 
the Thai economy, there has been a rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
sector relative to other sectors in the economy during the past 25 years. 
Part of the manufacturing sector expansion has been induced by foreign 
capital flows into this sector. Below we analyse, in a general 
equilibrium framework, some likely effects of this manufacturing boom on 
the traditional agricultural sector. Other important effects on the Thai
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economy have been associated with the vast expansion in cultivable land 
brought about by the development of a road network, especially during the 
Vietnam War, changes in the international terms of trade and certain 
government policies.
The basic model used in our analysis is a variant of the 'core model' 
discussed in detail in Corden and Neary (1982), and Corden (1982 and 
1984). There are 3 sectors in the economy: agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors producing tradeable goods and a non-tradeable service sector. 
Tradeables can be imported or exported, while non-tradeables are produced 
and consumed domestically. With the small country assumption, world prices 
of tradeables produced in the first two sectors are given. Domestically 
produced goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes for imports of the 
corresponding goods produced abroad. We assume that there are 3 factors of 
production: unskilled labour, which is mobile between sectors; land, which 
is specific to agriculture; and capital (including skilled labour), which 
is specific to a particular sector. In this kind of model, the key 
effects arising from the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector will be 
as follows.
3.2.1 'Resource puli' effect
The rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector requires extra inputs 
and will bid up prices of those factors employed in this sector, 
especially wage rates of unskilled labour which is mobile between sectors; 
meanwhile, there will be negligible or no effect on the rent paid to land 
and capital, as manufacturing uses so little land relative to agriculture 
and capital is specific to manufacturing. The supply curve for the output 
of agricultural sector will shift upwards due to increased costs, to the 
extent that it competes for seme of the inputs used in manufacturing 
(ceteris paribus), leading to a contraction of the agricultural sector or 
an expansion at a lower rate than what it would be otherwise. Evidence
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given in the previous chapter shows that the share of manufacturing in GDP 
has increased, whilst the agricultural share in GDP has contracted. With 
regard to real wages, evidence in Table 3-2 below indicates a rising trend 
in the real wage index for every region during 1976-1981. The real wage 
rate in all other parts of Thailand (which produce mainly agricultural 
products) tended to rise at a much faster rate than the rate in Bangkok 
and nearby provinces (where most of the manufacturing plants are 
established) during the period. It seems that the growth of the
manufacturing sector in Thailand has put some upward pressure on the real 
wage rate in all regions.
Table 3-1: Consumer Price Index by Region
(1976 = 100)
Year
Whole
Kingdom Bangkok
Central
and
East
North Northeast South
(weight 100.0 56.05 16. 13 10.39 8.87 8. 56 )
1976 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1977 107.6 108.4 107.0 106.7 105.7 106.0
1978 116.1 117.9 113.4 115.0 114.0 113.6
1979 127.6 130.0 125.0 124. 1 123.3 125.2
1980 152.7 155.9 150.2 145.5 149.9 148.7
1981 172.1 176.8 167.2 162.8 169. 1 164.4
1982 181.1 186.3 175.2 171.5 178.2 173.0
1983 197.9 192.6 181.6 180.0 188.2 178.4
Source: Department of Business Economics, Bangkok
The basic 3 sector model is inadequate to analyse changes within the 
agricultural sector. However, the general approach can also be used to 
study changes within this sector. This aspect may be important in the 
Thai case as there seem to be further adverse effects on the traditional 
industry in agriculture, such as the rice industry. More diversified new 
crops have been grown which have competed for land, labour and capital, 
hence, bidding up the price of factors used in agriculture. (The rapid
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Table 3-2: Minimum Wage Rates and The Index in Real Terms
(baht/day)
Period Bangkok and Central Plain North
beginning nearby Industrial and and
Provinces South NorthEast
1973 (Feb.) 12
1974 (Jan.) 16
1974 (June) 20 18 16
1975 (Feb.) 25 18 16
Fiscal year^
1976 25 (100) 18 (100) 16 (100 )
1977 28 (103) 21 (110) 19 (112)
1978 35 (119) 28 (137) 25 (136)
1979 45 (138) 38 (169) 35 (177)
1980 54 (139) 47 (174) 44 (186)
1981 61 (138) 52 (174) 52 (196)
Source: Bank of Thailand, Annual Economic Report,
various issues
Note : Real wage index, in parentheses, is deflated
by the corresponding CPI given in Table 3-1
expansion of cultivable land, in the past, should offset the upward 
pressure on the real price of land to some extent.) Evidence in Table 2-8 
shows that the share of rice production in agriculture has been declining 
while the production of new crops such as sugar cane, maize and cassava 
have significantly increased their share in agriculture during the past 
two decades. The rapid expansion of these new crops have, as already 
pointed out, been facilitated by external demand, the rapid expansion of 
cultivable land and the low domestic rice price caused by the rice 
premium.
1Beginning October 1
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3.2.2 'Income and Spending' effects
The manufacturing boom, in both import substitution and export 
expansion, generates extra income which will be spent in the economy. 
Certain groups of people earn more income and tend to increase their 
spending, leading to increases in demands for tradeable and/or 
non-tradeable goods.
(a) If the demand for tradeables rises, imports will increase and 
there will be a real depreciation of domestic currency, ceteris 
paribus. With the fixed exchange rate policy in Thailand, the 
baht will be overvalued and net foreign reserves will fall.
(b) If the demand for non-tradeables increases, their prices will 
rise, and so will the prices of factors employed in the 
non-tradeable service sector. The gradual growth of the 
service sector in the Thai economy also has a 'resource puli' 
effect which might adversely affect the tradeable sectors 
through competition for factors. Moreover, if non-tradeables 
have a large component of imported intermediate content, import 
payments will rise and there will be a real depreciation of 
domestic currency. This 'exchange rate' effect is likely to be 
a smaller degree than the case discussed in (a), in which extra 
income is spent on tradeables.
A boom in manufacturing also generates extra revenue for the 
government through increased income tax, business and excise tax, and 
export tax gained from the increase in manufactured exports. The 
government may invest the additional revenue in new projects. If the 
project is of a labour-intensive nature intended, for example, to create 
more employment and to provide extra income to farmers in rural areas, 
income and spending effects similar to the ones discussed above will be 
set in motion. On the other hand, if the project is of a
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capital-intensive nature, such as a large scale irrigation project which 
has a high import content, the exchange rate effect will be set in motion 
and cause another decline in the net foreign reserves with a fixed 
exchange rate regime.
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector means 
that more tradeables are produced and there is likely to be a real 
appreciation of domestic currency or an increase in net foreign reserves 
with a fixed exchange rate regime. This will have an adverse effect on 
the local export industries. On the other hand, increased import 
payments, as a result of rising demand for tradeables, will lead to a real 
depreciation of domestic currency (other things being equal). The actual 
outcome of the 'exchange rate' effects depends on the magnitudes of these 
forces.
The rapid expansion in the manufacturing sector over time, in 
comparison with the sudden boom in the discoveries of a new resource, 
means that there will be a much greater degree of the 'resource pull’ 
effect and a much smaller degree of the 'exchange rate' effect in the 
former case than the latter, due to the greater investment (in relation to 
return) necessary to expand manufacturing (see the discussion in Forsvth 
1985, pp. 2-11).
3.3 Economic Adjustment to Government Policies and Exogenous Shocks
Government policies are controllable but exogenous shocks brought 
about by changes in world markets, such as the oil price increases or a 
sudden decline or rise in the world prices of major export commodities of 
Thailand are not controllable. Given the openness of the Thai economy, 
changes in relative prices of exports and imports reflected in the 
country's terms of trade, tend to have significant effects on the economy. 
Changes in factor endowments and improvements in technology over time 
usuallv contribute positively to the growth of the economy. Below we
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discuss the impact of certain government policies and changes in the 
country's terms of trade on the agricultural sector of the Thai economy.
3.3.1 Industrial Protection Policy
The deliberate use of tariff, tax and other protection measures have 
effectively protected Thai industries during the past 25 years. In the 
1960s, a mild tariff was implemented to encourage import-substitution 
industries, particularly those producing consumer goods. From about 1972, 
the government industrial policy shifted toward export promotion, but 
import-substitution industries continued to receive assistance as evident 
in the higher tariff. The rates of protection have generally been higher 
for consumer goods than for intermediate and capital goods, as evident 
from Table 3-3 below.
Substantial government investment during the 1960s in building major 
highways linking different parts of the country to Bangkok provided some 
incentives to manufacturing by facilitating the distribution of 
manufactured goods from industrial plants clustered around Bangkok to 
other areas; as well as facilitating the transportation of raw materials, 
especially of agricultural type, produced in other regions of the country 
for use in the production process in many of these plants. In the 1960s, 
it was apparent that most government enterprises were run at a loss due to 
lack of business experience, inefficiency and sometimes corruption, hence, 
private domestic and foreign industrial enterprises were promoted (see 
Promsiri 1969, pp.51-52). The private sector has proved to be more
efficient and has made substantial contributions to the rapid growth of 
the manufacturing sector in the Thai economy during the past two decades. 
Nonetheless, this seems to have been assisted, to a large extent, by 
strong protection and government infrastructure investment. As Siamwalla 
(1975a, p.38) has argued:
Very few of the industries can survive without tariff 
protection, although among these few there are admittedly some
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Table 3-3: Average Rates of Protection
(%)
Nominal Rates Effective rates
of Protection of Protection
1971 1974 1978 1971 1974 1978
Processed foods 
Beverages &
50.9 5.8
tobacco
Construction
116.5 150.1
materials 21.8 32.9
Intermediates I 11.4 0.3
Intermediates II 
Non-durable
36. 1 30.0
consumer goods 44.9 39.8
Consumer durables 45.0 48.2
Machinery 10.2 28.0
Transport equipment 58.8 37.9
All Industries n.a.
All Industries excl. 
food, beverages
30.8
and tobacco n.a. n.a
Non-import-competing 71.2 34.6
Import-competing 33.6 24.8
Exports -7.4 -6.5
9.0 205.9 -46.4 78.5
69. 1 439.2 946.2 4.0
12.2 23.4 49.3 91.7
14.8 15.3 -6.7 16.2
19.2 50.3 75.4 55.3
64.6 57.4 134.6 212.4
57.3 93.2 136.2 495.6
21.4 7.6 23.7 58. 3
80.5 146.5 135.0 417.2
27.3 87.2 18.6 70.2
36.4 44.2 45.9 90.3
50.8 175.0 39.7 99.6
35.7 56. 1 44.8 85.9
-13.7 -24.3 -39.9 -40.3
Source : IBRD (1980), Industrial Development Strategy in Thailand, 
Table 7, referred to in Mongkolsmai (1983)
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very important industries, such as textiles, hotels, cement and 
glass. Even though the share of industry in the GNP expanded, it 
is doubtful if this result would hold if more realistic prices 
were used in the calculation of value added.
3.3.2 The Urban-bias in Agricultural Pricing Policy
It is widely believed that low crop yields in Thailand have been the 
result of the government urban-bias policy which has maintained the prices 
of farm products at relatively low levels to assist low-income urban 
consumers. This means that important inputs necessary for higher yields, 
such as fertilizers and other chemical products, are not adequately 
applied as farmers cannot afford the high prices for these inputs. The 
rice premium, discussed earlier at some length, is the most significant 
policy affecting the relative prices of agricultural products. In addition 
to the rice premium, a sugar premium was imposed in 1972, when the world 
price of sugar rose substantially due to a world food shortage in that 
year. The premium was reversed to become a subsidy when the world price of 
sugar fell below a certain level. Rubber is another agricultural product 
which is also subject to export duty, but the amount of rubber export duty 
is usually low. The point that should be noted about the price policy is 
that it has been biased against agriculture by keeping domestic prices of 
most agricultural products below world prices, with the burden borne by 
producers in terms of lower farm gate prices (see also Mongkolsmai 1983, 
pp.43-44).
3.3.3 Terms of Trade Effect
An important source of exogenous shocks to the Thai economy has been 
the international terms of trade. The effects of a changes in terms of 
trade can be briefly analysed as follows. Consider a deterioration in the 
terms of trade; i.e. the relative price of importables to exportables 
rises. Given a fixed exchange rate and a positive current account balance 
of the economy, this may lead to a deficit and the exchange rate becomes
overvalued.
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The terms of trade for Thailand has, as already mentioned, shown a 
declining trend since 1975 as the result of successive increases in its 
import prices relative to its export prices. Since the economy depends, 
to a large extent, on imports of energy and capital goods, as is evident 
in Table 3-5, the rising relative prices of imports and exports implies a 
larger trade deficit than otherwise. As import payments increase, there 
will be a depreciation in domestic currency with a floating exchange rate 
and the prices of tradeable goods will rise. With a fixed exchange rate 
in Thailand, the baht becomes overvalued and the country's net foreign
reserves fall.
Table 3-6 shows that the foreign exchange reserves of Thailand,
expressed as the percentage of GDP, have shown a declining trend since
1975. The Thai baht was pegged to the US dollar from about 1955-1978. It 
was then unpegged from the dollar and tied to a basket of currencies, but 
that policy was reversed in 1981 linking the baht once more to the dollar 
(see EIU 1984, p.7). A sequence of devaluations of the baht took place 
during the early 1980s as part of the government policy to ease balance of 
payments problems and to promote exports, but the devaluations did not 
seem to have any discernible effects. Table 3-7 shows that the balance of 
payments between 1970 and 1983 recorded deficits in both the trade and
current account balances during the period. Despite the steady increase in 
export earnings, imports payments for oil with its rising price and the 
increasing volume of other imports were greater. The current account, in 
recent years, benefited to some extent from a flow of remittances from 
Thai people working in construction and services in Middle East countries. 
The deficits of both accounts, expressed as the percentage of GDP shown in 
Table 3-8, have been worsening since about 1977. The most recent 
devaluation of 14.8 per cent took place in November 1984, leading to an 
increase in the exchange rate of 27 baht per US dollar compared with 23
baht during 1982-1983, an analysis of the effects of this devaluation
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still awaits further evidence. The net capital inflow, accounting for 1.6 
per cent of GDP in 1970, increased steadily during the period and was 
particularly high between 1979 and 1981. It seems that the relatively 
large capital inflow in those particular years was due to increases in 
foreign borrowing (see Table 3-9) rather than foreign direct investment. 
The increased borrowing might have been required to pay for the rising 
price of imports relative to exports (deterioration in the term of trade) 
during the period. It should be noted that the capital account, which 
shows positive capital inflow was, in several years during 1970-1983, not 
enough to compensate for the higher deficits in the trade and current 
account balances.
3.4 Major Conclusions
The industrial protection policy, in particular tariff protection, 
initially helped, in accordance with the infant industry argument, the 
growth of the manufacturing sector in the Thai economy. It is widely 
argued that continuing industrial protection has resulted in the rapid 
development of home-market oriented and inefficient industries. The shift 
towards an export promotion policy, through various incentives, to correct 
for bias towards the home-market, however, were broadly confined to 
manufactured exports. These have adversely affected the traditional
agricultural sector mainly through the 'resource puli' effect and the
sector has been squeezed. Tax on agricultural exports, which is part of 
the urban-bias price policy, has caused further adverse effects, 
particularly by reducing the profits of rice farmers in relation to
profits earned in other industries.
There has been an increasing concern, as expressed by the Bank of
Thailand (the central bank) and the NESDB (the planning body), on the 
foreign trade position of the economy, due to the declining trend in the 
country's terms of trade during the last 10 years. Rising import prices,
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relative to export prices for mainly agricultural products, have a direct 
effect on the traditional sector via the increased costs of imported 
machinery and fuels, as well as an indirect effect via the increasing 
relative prices of other consumer goods to agricultural products.
In the next chapter, we attempt to quantitatively assess the impact 
of some of the changes discussed above on the agricultural sector. This 
will enable an evaluation of their relative importance, and facilitate the 
deriving of implications for future policy.
Table 3-4: Imports by Economic Classification
(Millions of Baht)
Interne-
Year Consumer
goods
' diates 
and Raw 
materials
Capital
goods
Fuels (Crude 
and Oil)
Lubricants
Others Total 
Imports
1970 5,378 6,725 9,731 2,329 1,198 3,206 27,009
1971 4,755 7,764 8,628 2,721 1,941 2,926 26,794
1972 5,725 9,131 9,783 3,115 2,432 3,121 30,875
1973 7,055 13,677 12,826 4,605 3,516 4,021 32,184
1974 8,380 18,370 19,808 12,571 10,382 4,915 64,044
1975 8,855 16, 105 22,239 14,233 12,076 5,403 66,835
1976 9,418 20,216 19,405 16,695 13,857 7,143 72,877
1977 11,114 26,921 24,393 20,889 16,448 10,860 94,177
1978 12,942 29,598 31,317 22,851 16,527 12,191 108,899
1979 15,933 43,500 39,902 32,647 23,425 14, 179 146,161
1980 19,286 45,312 46,075 58,733 39,304 19,280 188,686
1981 22,985 53,575 56,772 65,100 47,240 18,314 216,746
1982 22,783 48,596 47,778 60,765 45,053 16,694 196,616
1983 29,860 59,513 69,249 57,064 39,975 20,763 236,449
Source : Bank of Thailand, Annual Economic Report, 
various issues
Note : Fuels including Crude Oil
Table 3-5: Imports by Economic Classification
(% )
Year
Interme- 
Consumer diates 
goods and Raw
materials
Capital
goods
Fuels (Crude 
and Oil)
Lubricants
Others Total 
Imports
1970 19.9 24.9 34.7 8.6 (4.4) 11.9 100
1971 17.7 29.0 32.2 10.2 (7.2) 10.9 100
1972 18.5 29.6 31.7 10.1 (7.9) 10.1 100
1973 16.7 32.4 30.4 10.9 (8.3) 9.5 100
1974 13. 1 28.6 30.9 19.6 (16.2) 7.7 100
1975 13.2 24. 1 33.3 21.3 (18. 1 ) 8. 1 100
1976 12.9 27.7 26.6 22.9 (19.0) 9.8 100
1977 11.8 28.6 25.9 22.2 (17.5) 11.5 100
1978 11.9 27.2 28.8 21.0 (15.2) 11.1 100
1979 10.9 29. 8 27.3 22.3 (16.0) 9.7 100
1980 10.2 24.0 24.4 31.1 (20.8) 10.2 100
1981 10.6 24.7 26.2 30.0 (21.8) 8.4 100
1982 11.6 24.7 24.3 30.9 (22.9) 8.5 100
1983 12.6 25.2 29.3 24. 1 (16.9) 8.8 100
Source : Calculated from Table 3-4
Note : Fuels including Crude Oil
Table 3—6: Terms of Trade and Foreign Exchange Reserves
Terms of Foreign Exchange Exchange
Year trade Reserves rate
(1975=100) (m. US$) (% of GDP) (baht/US$)
1970 119 790 12. 1 20.80
1971 101 736 10.6 20.80
1972 105 896 11.3 20.80
1973 138 1,132 10.8 20.62
1974 118 1,681 12.6 20.375
1975 100 1,605 10.9 20.379
1976 92 1,725 10.4 20.40
1977 88 1,735 9.0 20.40
1978 88 1,974 8.5 20.336
1979 91 1,794 6.6 20.419
1980 86 1,552 4.6 20.476
1981 75 1,671 4.6 21.82
1982 64 1,513 4. 1 23.00
1983 71 1,560 3.9 23.00
Source : Bank of 
various
Thailand,
issues
Annual Economic Report,
56
Table 3-7: Balance of Payments
(Millions of Baht : Minus Sign Indicates Debit)
Year
Trade 
balance ;
Net
Services
Net
Transfer
Current
account
balance
Net
Capital
Inflow
SDRs Errors
Overall
Balance
1970 -12,258 6,041 1,012 -5,205 2,221 332 -2,652
1971 -10,065 5,404 904 -3,757 1,736 298 1,388 -335
1972 -8,885 6,583 816 -1,486 3,663 321 1,493 +3,991
1973 -10,802 6,836 2,969 -997 2,282 - -421 +864
1974 -13,856 8,088 5,500 -268 6,708 - 1,572 +8,012
1975 -20,161 6,161 1,632 -12,368 7,755 - 1,755 -2,858
1976 -1 1,085 1,642 465 8,978 9,263 - -3 68 -83
1977 -25,599 2,405 802 -22,392 13,967 - 887 -7,538
1978 -28,540 4,279 816 -23,445 14,858 - -4,711 -13,298
1979 -47,053 3,239 1,224 -42,591 33,766 494 406 -7,925
1980 -57,984 11,144 4,276 -42,564 50,777 506 -3,540 +5,179
1981 -65,782 6,042 3,691 -56,049 55,130 488 2,962 +2,531
1982 -36,137 8,795 4,204 -23,138 38,345 - -11,893 +3,314
1983 -89,128 16,724 6,377 -66,027 35,395 12,554 -18,078
Source : Bank of Thailand, Annual Economic Report,various issues
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Table 3-8: Balance of Payments as the Percentage of GDP
(%)
Year
Trade
balance
Net
Services
Net
Transfer
Current
account
balance
Net
Capital
Inflow
SDRs Errors
Overall
Balance
1970 -9.0 4.4 0.7 -3.8 1.6 0.2 -1.9
1971 -7.0 3.7 0.6 -2.6 1.2 0.2 1.0 -0.2
1972 -5.4 4.0 0.5 -0.9 2.2 0.2 0.9 +2.4
1973 -5.0 3.2 1.4 -0.5 1. 1 - -0.2 +0.4
1974 -5. 1 3.0 2.0 -0. 1 2.5 - 0.6 +3.0
1975 -6.7 2. 1 0.5 -4.1 2.6 - 0.6 -1.0
1976 -3.3 0.5 0. 1 -2.7 2.7 - -0. 1 -0.02
1977 -6.5 0.6 0.2 -6.0 3.6 - 0.2 -1.9
1978 -6. 1 0.9 0.2 -5.0 3.2 - -1 . 0 -2.8
1979 -8.5 0.6 0.2 -7.7 6.1 0.1 0.1 -1.4
1980 -8.5 1.6 0.6 -6.2 7.4 0. 1 -0.5 +0.8
1981 -8.4 0.8 0.5 -7.1 7.0 0.1 0.4 +0.3
1982 -4.3 1.0 0.5 -2.7 4.5 - -1.4 +0.4
1983 -9.6 1.8 0.7 -7.1 3.8 1.4 -2.0
Source : calculated from Table 3-7
Table 3-9: GDP and Foreign Borrowing 1970-1983
Year
GDP
(market prices)
1
(billions of baht)
Foreign Borrowing
2 3
(billions of baht) (% of GDP)
1970 136. 1 0. 17 0. 12
1971 144.6 0.22 0. 15
1972 164.6 0.23 0. 14
1973 216.5 0.21 0. 10
1974 271.4 0.28 0. 10
1975 298.8 0.57 0.19
1976 337.6 0.94 0.28
1977 393.0 1.42 0.36
1978 470.0 2.71 0.58
1979 556.2 4.81 0.86
1980 684.9 5.87 0.86
1981 786.2 7.61 0.97
1982 846. 1 8.27 0.98
1983 924.3 9.29 1.01
Source : 1 NESDB, National Income of Thailand,
various issue
2 IMF, International Monetary Statistics 1984, 
p p .448-49
3 calculated
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CHAPTER 4
A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR THAILAND
The impact of the following changes, which are expected on the basis 
of the theoretical analysis, are quantitatively analysed in this study:
1. Substantial investment in road building led to an expansion of 
potentially cultivable land during the 1960s and the early 1970s.
To what extent would the agricultural sector and the total output 
of the economy be affected by the absence of this expansion in 
the land endowment?
2. What were the effects of relative changes in factor endowments?
3. To what extent was the agricultural sector affected by a decline 
in the terms of trade?
4. How important was the trade policy impact on the production of 
tradeables and total output of the economy with regard to:
- a substantial reduction in the rate of import tariff?
- a substantial reduction in the rate of export tax, 
mainly imposed on exports of major crop products?
A simple computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Thailand is 
developed in section 4.1 to perform the quantitative analysis. The Thai 
economy, in general, may be considered a competitive market economy and 
agents involved are usually responsive to price signals. The virtue of a 
CGE model for this analysis is that it works through the price mechanism 
in guiding the allocation of resources by allowing for flexible prices, in 
contrast to the fixed prices assumption in the traditional input-output 
models. Model results from the experiments performed on the CGE model are
discussed in section 4.2.
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4.1 Development of a Simple CGE Model for Thailand
The model employed to examine the impact of the changes listed above 
is a simple CGE model. Mathematical detail of the CGE model is not 
discussed here but can be found, for example, in Boadway and Treddenick 
(1978), or Mendoza et al (1983). The basic data used in the model are 
drawn, with some adjustments, from the 1975 social accounting matrix (SAM) 
for Thailand (see NESDB-IBRD, 1982). Tyers (1985) has developed a 
computer package for a SAM-based general equilibrium model, which he used 
to estimate effects on the rubber industry in Malaysia arising from the 
structural changes in the Malaysian economy. We apply this model, using 
the SAM data for Thailand, to perform the quantitative analysis of this 
study.
4.1.1 Model Description
From the analysis in the previous chapter, the economy is divided 
into the major 3 sectors. In the CGE model the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors are further disaggregated and the economy is assumed 
to have six sectors: namely crops, other agriculture, minerals, light
industry, heavy industry and services, and to have four separate 
homogenous factors: capital, labour, land and mineral resources. The 
latter two factors are used only in the production of crops and the 
mineral sector respectively. The ratio of income from capital to income 
from labour for each sector, in 1975, is calculated as follows:
Crops 0.21 
Other agriculture 1.90 
Minerals 1.41 
Light Industry 0.34 
Heavy Industry 1.20 
Services 0.71
The above ratios indicate that crops and light industry were 
labour-intensive sectors, while heavy industry, minerals and other
agriculture were capital-intensive sectors in the Thai economy. The
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service sector was more capital-intensive than the former sectors and less 
capital-intensive than the latter sectors.
The 6 sectors are aggregates of the 17 activities in the SIAM 2 model 
(NESDB-IBRD, 1982). A detailed breakdown of these aggregates is given in 
Appendix III. The original 1975 aggregate SAM for Thailand is presented 
in Table 4-1. The reference SAM (1975 ) derived in Table 4-2 does not 
exactly conform with the aggregate SAM in Table 4-1, due to some 
adjustments made in order to incorporate the features and assumptions made 
in the CGE model used in our analysis, see also Tables 11.1(a) and (b) in 
Appendix II, which compare the SIAM 2's SAM figures with the National 
Accounts of Thailand in 1975.
The CGE model can explore, quantitatively, the impact of changes in 
factor endowments and of changes in tax and tariff rate. There is no
capital account in the model, so it is not a. dynamic but _a comparative 
static model. The interrelationships between sectors specified in the 
model ensure that its solutions, due to changes in certain parameters, are 
internally feasible and consistent. The solution of each experiment is 
obtained through a sequence of adjustments in the factor prices (iterative 
Walrasian adjustments) until an equilibrium is reached and the factor 
markets are clear.
A very good explanation of a social accounting matrix (SAM) and 
interpretations of its entries can be found in King (1981). In summary, 
each row records all income received by an institution, a sector, or other 
agent assigned to that row; and each column records all expenditures of 
the agent. By accounting convention, total expenditure of each agent is 
equal to its income, implying that each column sum is equal to the 
corresponding row sum. Figure 4-1 represents the schematic SAM used in 
this study. The reference SAM (Table 4-2) indicates that Thailand, in 
1975, was a net exporter of crop and other agricultural products (the 
entries in rest of the world column on the right hand side of the Table)
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and a net importer of the products of minerals, light industry and heavy 
industry (the entries in rest of the world row on the left hand side of 
the Table). Elasticities of world excess demand and excess supply for 
foreign trade are assumed to have large values, consistent with the small 
country assumption. Total export tax is the entry at the intersection of 
the institutions row and the rest of the world column; while the total 
import tariff is the entry at the intersection of the institutions row and 
the institutions column.
4.1.2 Assumptions
Apart from those features of the CGE model discussed above, the 
following assumptions are made (these are summarized from Tyers (1985, 
pp.3-4 )):
- Perfect competition in all factor and product markets.
- Factor endowments (capital, labour, land and minerals resources) 
are exogenously determined.
- Each of the 6 sectors produces one homogenous product which is 
a perfect substitute for the corresponding traded product.
- A Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed for each sector 
and intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions for a 
given level of output of each sector. Unit elasticities of 
substitution for primary factors are assumed in this function, 
intermediate inputs are not substitutable.
- Household, corporations and the government are combined into 
the aggregate of institutions whose income is derived from 
selling the factors they own.
- Consumers maximize their utility, for a given level of income, 
assuming Cobb-Douglas utility functions with unit income and 
price elasticities of demand.
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- The rates of import tariffs and export taxes on tradeables 
(agricultural and manufacturing products) are exogenously 
determined and services are non-tradeable.
- The current account is assumed to be exactly balanced 
(no surplus or deficit), and the exchange rate is determined 
endogenously so as to achieve the current account balance.
4.2 Model Results
To explore the aspects of the changes listed in section 4.1, we 
proceed from the reference SAM to experiment with some parameter changes 
between 1975 and 1980. A set of results from these experiments is given 
in Tables 4-3 through 4-8. These results are expressed in terms of 
percentage changes in expenditure/income which accrues to the agents 
listed in the reference SAM in Table 4-2. The change in exchange rate, 
representing the change in the domestic price of foreign exchange, for 
each experiment is also given at the end of each table. It should be 
noted as Tyers (1985, p.5) points out that:
The version of the model on which these results are based does 
not evaluate the relative prices of products, factors and foreign 
exchange in terms of any predetermined numeraire. Nonetheless,
the set of these prices at which equilibrium is attained are 
meaningfully interpreted only in relative terms.
Moreover the assumptions made about each factor being homogenous and 
mobile across sectors as well as the aggregates of sectors are very 
crucial. Model results should be cautiously interpreted bearing in mind
the limitations of the assumptions made in the model.
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4.2.1 Reduction in the Land Endowment
In the first experiment (Table 4-3), the land endowment was reduced 
by about 32 per cent (by assuming the expansion of the cultivated area at 
an arbitarily annual rate of 2 per cent during 1960-1975, compared with 
the actual annual average rate of 4.6 per cent during that period). The 
adjustments that took place in order to clear the factor markets were:
quantity price
change change
capital 0 0.2%
labour 0 -0.9%
land -32% 40.3%
resources 0 3.6%
Had land area expanded more slowly up to 1975, then the crop sector would 
have been smaller proportion of GNP by 0.6% (see Table 4-9) and the land 
price in 1975 would have been higher by 40%. The wage would have been 
lower relative to the prices of both land and capital. Crop production
declined by 4% and production of other agriculture, light industry and 
services, which used crop production as part of their intermediate input, 
declined somewhat relative to the reference SAM in Table 4-2. Crop
exports and total exports declined by about 14%, the total output of the 
economy fell by only 0.8%, however. This was due, to a certain extent, to 
the increased output of minerals and heavy industry brought about by the 
increased inputs employed in these sectors which were released from the 
other sectors. It thus seems that although agriculture benefited from 
substantial investment in infrastructure, the growth of the economy would 
still be maintained if the investment were made elsewhere in the economy,
e.g. in the heavy industry sector.
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4.2.2 Changes in the Factor Endowments
Table 4-4 gives the results of a change in labour endowment relative 
to the 1980 figure representing an increase of 24.5%. Factor markets 
adjusted as follows:
quantity
change
price
change
capital 0 13.6%
labour 24.5% -6.7%
land 0 22.7%
resources 0 -3.1%
The increased labour (other things being equal) resulted in the expansion 
of the crop sector at a much higher rate than all the other more 
capital-intensive sectors and the price of labour fell relative to the 
prices of other factors. With the decreased wage rate, labour would lose 
while capital and land owners would gain from the relative factor price 
change. Total output increased by 16%. Crop exports and total exports 
expanded by more than 50% relative to the reference SAM in Table 4-2.
Proceeding to the experiment in Table 4-5, in which all the factor 
endowments were increased to the 1980 figures (see Table II.2 in Appendix 
II) we obtain the following changes in the factor markets:
quantity
change
price
change
capital 68.4% -13.5%
labour 24.5% 10.0%
land 8.6% 7.0%
resources 64.0% 16.7%
Capital accumulated at a higher proportionate rate than the growth of the 
labour force between 1975 and 1980, leading to a fall in relative prices 
of capital and labour. Given fixed factor-income proportions in all
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sectors of the economy, increased capital endowment relative to labour 
endowment tended to have adverse effects on the (labour-intensive) crop 
sector, by absorbing most of the increased labour to be used in
combination with the increased capital in the more capital-intensive
1sectors. The results follow the Rybczynski theorem (see, for example, 
Staley 1970, pp30-31, Jones 1979, pp. 79-81, Caves and Jones 1973, pp.
113-114); with increased capital relative to labour, the relative cost of 
producing capital-intensive goods would be lower and its production would 
expand while production of the labour-intensive sector would decline. 
Table 4-5 also shows that crop exports and total exports declined 
substantially relative to the reference SAM. With decreased total exports, 
total imports fell correspondingly, particularly those of heavy industry 
and mineral products. The increase in all factor endowments to the 1980 
level resulted in an increase in total output of 38.3% and the increase in 
labour endowment alone led to an increase in total output of 15.7%. A set 
of experiments, changing one factor endowment at a time to the 1980 level, 
was performed and the decomposition of the changes in total output due to 
each factor was obtained as follows:
quantity total output
change change
capital 68.4% 21.8%
labour 24.5% 15.7%
land 8.6% 0.2%
resources 64.0% 0.8%
The changes in land and resource endowments had little impact on the total 
output of the economy relative to the changes in capital and labour 
endowments. Moreover, the change in labour tended to have a larger impact
1 presented in T. N. Rybczynski, "Factor endowment and Relative Commodity 
Prices", Economica, XXII, No.4, November 1955, pp.336-341
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on total output than a similar proportionate change in capital. The
caveat noted about the results is that changes in the price of foreign 
exchange varied in these experiments. Further experiment with a 1% change 
in capital led to a change in total output of 0.3%, implying an
incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) of 3.3, i.e. a marginal increase 
in total output by 1 unit would require an increase in capital by 3.3 
unit. This value is close to the average for newly-industrialised
middle-income countries (see Naya et al., 1984).
4.2.3 Terms of Trade
Unfortunately the effects of the deterioration in the terms of trade 
discussed in subsection 3.3.3 could not be analysed here as the model, in 
its present version, can not handle large changes in some parameters. 
Substantial changes in the terms of trade would require changes in
relative price of imports to exports in such a way that the direction of 
trade would have to be reversed. For example, with the actual increase in 
world price of mineral imports, the model would rather export than import 
its products. Moreover, as oil and other mineral imports were aggregated 
into one sector, a large proportion of imported oil could not be 
differentiated from local mineral products in this model. Due to time 
constraints the appropriate modification to the model was not made.
4.2.4 Trade Policy
Table 4-6 shows the results of an experiment with a 25% reduction in 
the tariff rates imposed on the imports of the following products:
original new
rate rate
2. 0% 1.5%
25.0% 18.8%
18.0% 13.5%
minerals 
light industry 
heavy industry
71
Imports of manufactured products rose substantially (c.f. Table 4-2) 
while the local manufacturing sector, especially heavy industry, 
contracted. Mineral imports fell somewhat due, probably, to the 
contraction of the heavy-industry sector, which had a relatively large 
imported content (particularly oil imports). Production of crops and 
other agriculture increased by 8.2% and 0.5% respectively and total 
exports rose by 35%. Total output increased by 0.4% and the exchange rate 
adjusted upwards by 1.7% implying a real depreciation, as a result of the 
tariff reduction.
Table 4-7 shows results of an experiment with a 25% reduction in the 
rate of export taxes on the following products:
original new
rate rate
crops 6.7% 5.0%
other agriculture 4.6% 3.5%
On the whole the results obtained in this experiment are in the same 
direction as the results shown in Table 4-6, but with smaller magnitudes. 
The crop sector expanded at a lower rate and the manufacturing sector
contracted at a lower rate than the corresponding results in Table 4-6. 
Total exports rose by 12% and total output increased by 0.1%. Table 4-8 
shows the results of an experiment with the removal of export taxes, the 
crop sector expanded and the manufacturing sector contracted at higher 
rates than the corresponding results in Table 4-6. Total exports rose by 
47.6%, total output increased by 0.3%. The exchange rate adjusted 
downwards as a result of a reduction in or removal of export taxes.
We also experiment, using the same 25% reduced rates of import
tariffs and export taxes relative to the 1975 structure, with the 1980
factor endowments, their impact on GNP in comparison with the relevant
experiments above are summarized below:
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% change in GNP over 
initial 1975 figure
1975 factor endowments plus
1. -25% import tariff rates
2. -25% export tax rates
1980 factor endowments plus
3. original tax and tariff structure 38.3
4. -25% import tariff rates 39.0 (0.7)
5. -25% export tax rates 38.6 (0.3)
These results indicate that trade liberalisation would have increased 
GNP and that a reduction in the rates of import tariff in 1975 would have 
led to a larger increase in GNP than a similar reduction in the rates of 
export tax in that year, other things held constant. The increase in GNP 
would be magnified if similar reduced import and export tax rates were 
applied in 1980, i.e. the potential loss to the economy of maintaining
tariff and tax rates increased over the period. The above results show 
that GNP in 1980 would have increased by 0.7%, compared to 0.4% in 1975, 
if the same 25% reduced tariff rates were used, and 0.3% in 1980 compared 
to 0.1% in 1975 if the same 25% reduced export tax rates were implemented.
However it should also be noted that different adjustments of the exchange
rate took place in these excercises.
We may conclude that a move towards free trade would have tended to 
favour the agricultural sector by encouraging the expansion of crop 
production at the expense of manufacturing, especially heavy industry.
The service sector, which is non-tradeable, was not effected to any 
significant extent by the trade policy. In these experiments, the 
exchange rate changed in the direction expected. A reduction in import 
tariff rates tended to have a larger positive effect on GNP than a similar
0.4 
0 . 1
reduction in export tax rates.
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4.3 Summary and conslusions
The valued added share in GNP of the results of the experiments
discussed above are summarized in Table 4-9. A reduction in land
endowment [(2) c.f. (1)] did not have any discernible effects on the 
structure of the economy. The increase in the capital endowment [(3) c.f. 
(1)] adversely affected the agricultural sector and assisted in the 
expansion of the manufacturing sector while the increased labour [(4) c.f. 
(1)] resulted in the opposite. A move toward free trade, either by a 
reduction in tariffs or export taxes, [(5), (6) and (7) c.f. (1)] would
have favourable effects on the agricultural sector and adverse effects on 
the manufacturing factor. The share of the non-tradeable service sector 
was almost unaffected by any of the parameter changes experimented in this 
study.
When all the factor endowments are changed to the 1980 level [(8) 
c.f. (1)] agriculture's share in total output declined by 4.7%, accounting 
for most of the change that actually took place during 1975-1980 [(12) 
c.f. (11)]. The deterioration in the terms of trade during the period 
would have further negative impact on agriculture. However, the reduction 
in export taxes during the period would, to some extent, offset the
adverse effect on agriculture caused by the changes in factor endowments 
and the terms of trade.
It should be emphasized that the comparison of the quantitative
comparison above are subject to limitations and assumptions made in the 
model, such as that of full employment, the homogeneity of each factor and 
its perfect mobility across sectors. The factor endowments are
exogenously determined in this model, however, some changes could be 
induced by certain government policies. While the model in its present 
version illustrates the potential value of this approach, its use in 
exploring real world problems in a dynamic economy like Thailand requires
substantial modifications.
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Table 4-9: Structure of the economy induced by certain changes
(%)
Parameter Changes Agric. Minrls L/Ind H/Ind Servs Total
(a)
(1) 1975 Reference 31.1 5.1 13.4 7.9 42.5 100.0
MODEL EXPERIMENTS:
Factor Endowment
(2 ) land -32% 30.5 5.4 13.3 8.4 42.4 100.0
(3) capital +68% 25.2 6.8 14.0 11.6 42.4 100.0
(4) labour +24% 32.9 4.3 13. 1 7.0 42.7 100.0
Government Policy
(5) -25% M. tariff 33.2 5.2 13.3 6. 1 42.2 100.0
(6) -25% X. tax 32.0 4.9 13.4 7.3 42.4 100.0
(7 ) no X . tax 34.5 4.4 13.3 5.7 42. 1 100.0
Factor Endowments and Government Policy
(8) 1980 F.E. 26.4 (-4.7) 7.0 13.7 10.5 42.4 100.0
(9) 1980 F.E. plus 28.0 (-3.1) 7.0 13.7 9.1 42.2 100.0
-25% M. tariff
(10) 1980 F.E. plus 27.1 (-4.0) 6.8 13.7 10.0 42.4 100.0
-25% X. tax
Structure of GDP (National Income Account)
Year Agric. Non-agric. GDP
(b)
(11 ) 1975 30.4 69.6 100.0
(12) 1880 24.9 (-5.5) 75. 1 (+5.5) 100.0
Note : 1. (a) and (b) are slightly different due to the
inclusion of crop-related industries such as 
rice and other grains milling in agriculture 
instead of manufacturing in the former, this
slight modification is part of the data adjustment 
made in the CGE model.
2. F.E. = Factor Endowments, M. = imports, X. = exports
3. Figures in parentheses represent the percentage 
changes of the corresponding value added share in 
total income between 1975 and 1980.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the impact of exogenous shocks, including major 
government policies, on the agricultural sector of the Thai economy. 
During the past 25 years, the rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector, 
partly induced by a strong industrial protection policy, led to higher 
real wages and affected the agricultural sector adversely. The building 
of infrastructure, especially road building, opened up new land for 
cultivation and the area planted to new crops, in particular sugar cane, 
maize and cassava, expanded very rapidly. This was mainly in response to 
foreign-market demand. The area planted to rice, a traditional crop in 
Thailand, expanded only moderately in relation to these new crops, partly 
because of the rice premium which lowered its profitability for rice 
farmers. The international terms of trade have deteriorated in recent 
years due to an increase in relative prices of imports compared to 
exports. This had adverse effects on the economy and, in particular, the 
agricultural sector. Some of the policy implications derived from the 
results of this study are summarised in section 5.1 and the limitations of 
the study are noted in section 5.2.
5.1 Policy Implications
Some of the policy implications regarding the issues of structural 
change in the Thai economy examined in this study are summarized below:
1 . Further expansion in the cultivable land may no longer be 
possible. But its expansion in the past seems to have been
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important in lowering or maintaining the relative prices of 
land and labour. Increased crop production in the future may 
depend on raising crop yields. With the limitations inherent in 
the CGE model used in this study, changes within the crop 
sector have not been analysed, however, the evidence provided 
earlier indicates that the rapid expansion of sugar cane in the 
past was a response to favourable farm prices relative to rice, 
despite the higher export price of rice relative to sugar 
during the same period. This was mainly the effect of the rice 
premium. The removal or a substantial reduction in export taxes 
should result in more favourable farm prices for major crops, 
and this should assist in raising yields.
2. Increased capital is generally expected to have a larger impact 
on the GNP than increased labour in developing countries. The 
experiment on the CGE model results in the opposite outcome. 
This may be partly due to the full employment assumptions made 
in the model. In recent years, real wage rates in the Thai 
economy have risen relative to real interest rates (the price 
of capital) and this may be one of the major reasons for the 
the growing mechanization in the Thai agriculture. The results 
obtained fron the model are thus consistent with the direction 
of the relative price changes observed. This may imply that 
the comparative advantage of labour-intensive industries in the 
Thai economy may have been lessened in recent years because of 
rising real labour costs. The ICOR, estimated at 3.3 in 1975, 
is close to the average for newly-industrialised middle-income 
countries. A dynamic model where capital accumulation is 
endogeneous would be more appropriate to address this issue.
3. Liberalization of the trade regime, i.e. the removal of import
tariffs and export taxes, would have benefitial effects on the 
agricultural sector and lead to a contraction of the
manufacturing sector. Past government policies have held back 
the growth in agriculture.
4. The service sector is not likely to be affected to any 
significant degree by changes in trade policy.
5.2 Limitations of the Study
The study is a first step in analysing, within a general equilibrium 
framework, the impact of government policies and exogenous shocks on the 
agricultural sector of the Thai economy. Rigorous analysis should be 
carried out using a more sophisticated model. This requires substantially 
greater work, but this study illustrates the possibilities of using a CGE 
model for this kind of analysis. As Dervis et al (1982, p.2) have pointed
out:
Although theoretical reasoning and the insights gained from 
simplified abstract models must provide the starting point, more 
elaborate and "realistic" analysis is also required. Intelligent 
policy debate and policy formulation requires knowledge of the 
quantitative significance of the various mechanisms analyzed by 
theory. Furthermore, indirect effects of policies may escape 
intuition and thus the attention of theorists, whereas empirical 
modeling can reveal their presence and importance.
Given the severe time constraints, the model used in this study could not 
be modified to address a series of major issues with a great deal of 
realism. Many of the limiting assumptions of the model have been referred 
to in the discussion. In particular, the process of capital accumulation 
and growth is poorly handled by this type of model. However, the 
comparative static analysis, particularly relating to issues of government 
policies (such as trade policies) can be valuable guides to policy making 
once the model is appropriately adjusted. This remains a task for future
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research.
84
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akrasanee, N. (1975) "Import Substitution, Export Expansion and 
Sources of Industrial Growth", in P. Sondysuvan (ed.), 
Finance Trade and Economic Development in Thailand, Sompong 
Press, Bangkok.
Akrasanee, N. and J. Ajanant (1983) "Manufacturing Industry 
Protection in Thailand : Issues and Empirical Studies",
Asean-Australia Joint Research Project, Sub-project 3.
Bank of Thailand (1970-1983) Annual Economic Report, Rung Silp 
Press, Bangkok.
Barlow, C., C. Findlay, P. Forsyth and S. Jayasuriya (1985)
"Malaysian Structural Change and its Impact on Rubber", 
Paper presented to the Workshop on Structural Changes and 
Transfer of Technology in Rubber Industries of Malaysia and 
Indonesia, University of Adelaide, February 18-20, 1985.
Boadway R. and J. Treddenick (1978) "A General Equilibrium
Computation of the Effects of the Canadian Tariff Structure", 
Canadian Journal of Economics 11, pp.424-46.
Caves, R.E. and R.W. Jones (1977) World Trade and Payments, An 
Introduction, Little, Brown and Company, Boston Toronto.
Chuchart, C. and S. Tosoonthorn (1959) "Costs and Returns on Korat 
Farm Enterprises Year 1957", Kasetsart University, Bangkok, 
December.
Chuchart, C. and S. Tongpan (1965) "The Determination and Analysis 
of Policies to Support and Stabilize Agricultural Prices and 
Incomes of the Thai Farmers", Kasetsart University, Bangkok.
Corden, W.M. (1982) "Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics : 
A Survey", Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 
No. 079, The Australian National University, Canberra.
------------  (1984) "Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics :
Survey and Consolidation", Oxford Economic Paper, Vol. 36,
No.3, November, pp.359-380.
Corden, W.M. and J.P. Neary (1982) "Booming Sector and
De-industrialisation in a Small Open Economy", Economic 
Journal 92, December, pp.825-848.
85
Corden, W.M. and H.V. Richter (1967) "Trade and Balance of 
Payments", in T.H. Silcock (ed.), Thailand, Social and Economic 
Studies in Development, The Australian National University 
Press, Canberra.
Dervis, K. , J. de Melo and S. Robinson (1982) "General Equilibrium 
Models for Development Policy", A World Bank research 
publication, Cambrige University Press, Cambrige.
EIU (1984) Quarterly Economic Review of Thailand, Burma, Annual 
Supplement, The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., London.
Forsyth, P.J. (1985) "Booming Sectors and Structural Changes 
in Australia and Britain: A comparison", Research School of 
Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, 
March.
Ingram, J.C. (1971) Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970 , Stanford 
University Press, Stanford.
Jones, R.W. (1979) International Trade : Essays in Theory,
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
King, B.B. (1981) "What is a SAM? A Layman's Guide to Social 
Accounting Metrices", World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 463, 
Washington D.C.
Konjing, C. and A. Issariyanukula (1985) "Output Demand and
Marketing of Rices and Upland Crops in Thailand", in T. Panayotou 
T. Panayotou (ed.), Food Policy Analysis in Thailand, 
Agricultural Development Council, Bangkok.
Marzouk, G.A. (1972) Economic Development and Policies; a Study of 
Thailand, Rotterdam University Press, Rotterdam.
Mendoza, M.N., J. Roumasset and R. Clarete (1983) "Planning Policy 
With General Equilibrium Models : The Effects of Tariffs in 
the Philippines", Working Paper WP-83-19, Resource Systems 
Institutes, East-West Center, Honolulu.
Mongkolsmai, D. (1983) "Thailand : Overview of Food Production, 
Consumption and Trade", Asean-Austrlia Food Trade and Food 
Security Research Program.
Muscat, R.J. (1966 ) Development Strategy in Thailand, A_ study of 
Economic Growth, Frederick A. Pracker Publishers, New York.
Myint, H. (1958) "The 'Classical Theory' of International Trade 
and the Underdeveloped Countires," The Economic Journal, 
June, pp. 315-337.
Naya, S., D.H. Kim and W. James (1984) "External Shooks and Policy 
Responses : The Asian Experience", Asean Development Review, 
Vol 2. No. 1, pp. 1-22.
86
NESDB (1972-1984) National Income of Thailand, The Office of the 
Prime Minister, Bangkok.
-----  (1981 ) The Fifth National Economic and Social Development
Plan 1982-1966, The office of the Prime Minister, Bangkok.
NESDB-IBRD (1982) A Social Accounting Matrix for Thailand 1975,
A joint project between the National Economic and Social 
Development Board and the World Bank, December.
OAE (1972-1984) Agricultural Statistics of Thailand, Ministry of 
Agricultural and Co-operatives, Bangkok.
Pakkasem, P. (1983) "Medium Term Outlook of the Thai Economy 
(1981-87) : An Annotated Outline", Paper presented to 'The 
Siam Project on Macro Economic Management of the Thai Economy' 
Conference, Pattaya City, June 24-25, 1983.
Panayotou, T. (1985) Food Policy Analysis in Thailand, Agricultural 
Development Council, Bangkok.
Pinthong, C. and A. Siamwalla (1978) "A Preliminary Background Notes 
on Food and Nutrition Policy in Thailand", Thammasat 
University, Bangkok.
Promsiri, T. (1969) Thailand's Transition, Prae Pittaya, Bangkok.
Puapanichya, K. and J. Sriswasdilek (1981) "Food and Agricultural 
Policy Analysis: Input and Output Supply in Rice and Upland- 
Crop Production", Paper presented to the Second Workshop 
on Food and Agricultural Policy, Bangkok, August 5-6, 1981.
Siamwalla, A. (1975a) "Stability, Growth and Distribution in the 
Thai Economy" in P. Sondysuvan (ed.), Finance, Trade and 
Economic Development in Thailand, Sompong Press, Bangkok.
------------  (1975b) "A History of Rice Price Policies in Thailand", in
P. Sondysuvan (ed.), Finance, Trade and Economic Development in 
Thailand, Scmpong Press, Bangkok.
-------------  (1978) "Farmers and Middlemen : Aspects of
Agricultural Marketing in Thailand", Economic Bulletin for Asia 
and Pacific, June.
Silcock, T.H. (1967) Thailand, Social and Economic Studies in
Development, The Australian National University Press, 
Canberra.
------------  (1970) The Economic Development of Thai Agriculture,
The Australian National University Press, Canberra.
Staley, C.E. (1970) International Economics, Analysis and Issues, 
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliff.
87
Tyers, R. (1985) "Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy, 
Estimating Intersectoral Effects on the Rubber Industry Using 
a SAM-Based General Equilibrium Model", Paper presented to 
the Workshop on Structural Changes and Transfer of Technology 
in the Rubber Industries of Malaysia and Indonesia - Macro and 
Micro Perspectives, University of Adelaide, February 18-20, 
1985.
U.S. Department of Agriculture (1972) The Agricultural Economy of 
Thailand, Washington D.C.
Usher, D. (1978) "The Economics of the Rice Premium", Discussion 
Paper No. 60, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, 
Bangkok, January.
88
APPENDIX I
1
1
1 cu
- CT CO m ro m r - TJ» lD CT - - <X) t— O m CN CN *-- CT CT ro o <T lD
1
1
1
D
Ü 7
0
7
3
7
9
8
6
9
2
6
6
1
2
0
1
3
0
1
4
0
1
5
0
1
5
7
1
6
4
1
8
0
1
9
0
2
0
3
2
2
1
2
3
7
2
6
1
2
7
6
2
9
2
3
1
1
3
2
4
3
4
2
3
6
3
1
1
1 . lD o in o lD lD m ID m m r - 00 »X) CD r - co co co CN CN co co CT
-p
X.
1
1 t X) r - CO CO CT» o ^— CN CO m IX> CO CD CT rii co KD co r CT»
T“
ccJ
CQ
1
1
vii
cd
IN CN CN CO
Cp
1
1
0 1
CO
i
1
G 1■ U•H
cs CO m CO CT» CO CO CT in o CN r~ CT r r CT KD CN ID CN co in CO
u
•H
j
i
1 rH
o 1
CO CO CO CO CO in m ID r - r - r - r - co CO CT O - CN CO co i n
r~1
rHi
1
1
rM
3 <
• r i
CQ
1
1
1
Pi
1
1
1
tr»
G
•H -
- CN CN CO m »X) r* CD o - CN CO m <x> O ' 00 - CO m D ' CT CN
G
•H
1
1|
CO
Gr*i
CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CO CO CO CO co co co CO Tf in m
tn
•H
1
1
1
CJ
X
H
o 11
rH
n3
1
1
y
G
ro m CO CT» CN lD CN r - CN O CO ID CT CD CT ID CN ID ID CN CN CT
•H 1
1
■
<n
CD
▼— T_ T—CN CN CO CO m m »X) »X) r - 00 CT O *— CO in—^ i— CT
T—
CN 24
ID
CN
-P
WH
■
1
1»J
1
1 d)
H 1
1 m
T— e r m O' CO CN CT CN m 00 m CN CT CN CO CD CN r-~ in CN T_ 00 O
£ 1
1
I
1
P
E-* - -
CN CO in
T~ lD
r -
T— CN 22 23 26 27
CT
CN CO 34 35 38 43 45 4
8
m 52 55
CO
m
10
1
1
1 rnCD
u
■H
\
1
U i
c
fO
CO CT CO in (T »X) CT •^ T CN ■*r m co *3* in CN C'- co CN ro CT
G
CU
1
1
1
P TJ> in in ID lD lD r - r - CD CT CT o CN co CO
T—
ID co
20 CN 23
N 1
CN
CN I
r-»
(T^
1
1
1
1 Q
CN CO CO CO in r~ CT co <X> CT CO lD CD CN »X) - m CN KD co co co
-Pr-1
1
I
CD (_( O o o o o o o o
T— *— - - CN CN CN CO co N 1 m m ID lD CO
ctiI 1
1
1
I
w
H-1
w
1
•
I>-•
0
r  \
1
1
1w
1
1 CO
CO in o r - CT CN X) r - r - r " CN CN m in o O lD m ID in (T r -
4-*
11
G
o
CO CO m m »X) CD CD CO CO O' O'­ O ' r " CD o CN co r r 10 m m m »X?
r~\ 11
u
l—l
o 1
1
r —
1
1
1 tT
CN CO CO CO CN CT CT CN CO CO CN e r 10 CD in - in CD KD m co CO CT
H
m
1
1
1
CH
X
CO CT o T—
ir-
CN
r —
in O ' CT 1—
CN 23 25 27
^—
ro 34 36 42 48 5
2 57
09
64 67 72 76
w
r—1 1
1rQ
1
■ Cr*E-«
1
■
G
*H
CT» CT» - CO r - o CN m »X) »x» CT CT r - CT in CT m - m co IO CN
1 Gi O o *— CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN co N - 1 ? •^r in1
1
1
1
1
1
*ri
X
x
1
1
•H
P
CN * - CO T“ lO CT» CT CD 0 " O CO m o CN O T_ CT m m N 1 00 r - m co
1
1
1
1
U>
< 28 2
9 t—
CO 34 34 35 40 3
9
43 47
CO
iT 50 50 56 57 62
m
K D 65 7
2
72 77 7
8 T~
CO
N '
00
1
1
1 P o T“ CN CO m »X» r - CD CP> o CN CO N 1 m KD r " 00 CT o CN ro ■^r
1
1
(TJ
(L)
CD
CT>
KO
CT»
»D
CT»
lD
CT»
KO
(j\
lD
CT»
»X)
CT
KO
Q>S
lD
CT
KO
(J\ CT
r-
0^ (J\
r -
CT
O'
CTv
O '
<T
r - O '
CT
r- r -
CT
co co
n \
CO
rT\
CO
ST\
CO
1
1
1
>H r “ t — r — T— *— T—
u  • KJ »
T ~
KJ » u » U ’ V  « CT
Table 1.2 GDP at Constant 1972 Prices, by Agr. Subsector
(Billions of Baht)
Year Crops
Live-
Stock
Fish­
eries
For­
estry Agr. Non-agr. GDP
1960 21.9 3.6 0.8 1.9 28.2 41.9 70.
1961 22.5 3.7 0.9 2.0 29. 1 44.8 73.
1962 24.4 3.8 1. 1 2.0 31.3 48.5 79.
1963 26.6 3.9 1.4 2.2 34. 1 52.4 86.
1964 26.6 4.0 1.7 2.3 34.6 57.7 92.
1965 27.3 4. 1 1.9 2.6 35.9 63.6 99.
1966 32.0 4.3 2.2 2.4 40.9 70.8 111.
1967 29.5 4.8 2.9 2.6 39.8 80.6 120.
1968 32.2 4.8 3.8 2.9 43.7 86.9 130.
1969 34.5 5.0 4.6 2.9 47.0 93.9 140.
1970 35.5 5.0 5.0 2.8 48.3 101.8 150.
1971 36.9 5.6 5.0 3.0 50.5 106.6 157.
1972 36.0 5.9 5.2 2.9 50.0 114.6 164.
1973 41.7 6.3 5.3 2.9 56.2 123.9 180 .
1974 41.8 6.7 5.3 3.2 57.0 133.0 190.
1975 45.6 7.4 5.7 3.3 62.1 141.4 203.
1976 49.0 7.6 5.9 3.4 65.9 155.3 221.
1977 46.8 8. 1 7.5 3. 1 65.5 171.7 237.
1978 53.6 8.5 7.4 3.0 72.5 188.6 261 .
1979 51.8 8.9 7.3 3.4 71.4 205.5 276.
1980 54.2 9.0 6.3 3.3 72.8 220.1 292.
1981 58.5 9.5 6.8 2.9 77.7 233.6 311.
1982 59.9 9.9 6.0 2.7 78.5 245.5 324.
1983 61.9 10.3 6.6 2.6 81.4 261.5 342.
1984 63.6 10.7 7.0 3.0 84.3 279.3 363.
1
9
8
5
3
5
7
4
6
9
1
1
6
1
0
5
2
2
1
9
9
3
0
9
6
Source : NESDB
Table 1.3 GDP at Constant 1972 Prices, by Crops
(Billions of Baht)
Year Rice Rubber
Sugar
cane Maize Cassava
Other
crops
All
Crops
1960 12.3 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.4 7.2 21.9
1961 12.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 7. 1 22.5
1962 14.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 7.2 24.4
1963 15.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 7.7 26.6
1964 15.1 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.6 8.4 26.6
1965 14.5 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.5 9.8 27.3
1966 17.6 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.7 11.1 32.0
1967 14.6 0.9 0.6 1.3 0.6 11.5 29. 5
1968 16.2 1.1 0.6 1.4 0.7 12.2 32.2
1969 17.5 1.2 0.7 1.7 0.7 12.7 34.5
1970 17.6 1.3 1.1 1.9 1.1 12.5 35.5
1971 17.7 1.4 1.0 2.4 1.3 13. 1 36.9
1972 15.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.6 14.6 36.0
1973 18. 3 1.7 2. 1 2.4 2.3 14.9 41.7
1974 17.6 1.7 2.3 2.7 2.2 15.3 41.8
1975 19.8 1.6 3.0 2.9 2.5 15.9 45.6
1976 19.5 1.8 4. 1 2.7 3.6 17.3 49.0
1977 18. 2 1.9 2.8 1.7 4.4 17.8 46.8
1978 21.4 2.1 3.2 2.9 5.3 18.7 53.6
1979 21.6 2.5 1.9 2.9 3.9 19. 0 51.8
1980 21.0 2.2 3.0 3. 1 5.8 19. 1 54.2
1981 22.6 2.3 3.8 3.6 6.7 19.5 58.5
1982 22.1 2.6 6.7 2.8 6. 1 19.6 59.9
1983 23.9 2.8 4.6 3.5 6.6 20.5 61.9
1984 23.8 2.9 5.0 4.0 7. 1 20.8 63.6
Source : NESDB
Table 1.4 GDP, GNP, NNP and per capita GNP at
current market prices
(millions of baht)
Year
1
Current Market 
GDP GNP
Prices 2
NNP
Per Capita 
GNP 
(baht)
1960 53,984 53,885 46,448 26.39 2,042
1961 58,970 58,877 50,453 27.21 2,164
1962 63,793 63,695 54,333 28.05 2,271
1963 68,079 68,038 57,496 28.92 2,353
1964 74,667 74,589 62,203 29.82 2,501
1965 84,303 84,292 70,321 30.74 2,742
1966 101,375 101,366 80,050 32.00 3, 168
1967 108,294 108,462 89,594 33.00 3,287
1968 116,774 117,046 95,345 34.04 3,438
1969 128,566 128,792 104,504 35. 11 3,668
1970 136,060 136,439 110,390 36.22 3,767
1971 144,607 144,637 116,869 37.38 3,869
1972 164,626 164,299 133,676 38.58 4,259
1973 216,543 216, 119 178,622 39.69 5,445
1974 271,368 272,166 222, 128 40.78 6,674
1975 298,816 298,597 246,464 41.87 7,132
1976 337,635 336,374 278,895 42.96 7,830
1977 393,030 391,016 318,690 44.04 8,879
1978 469,952 464,550 378,389 45. 10 10,300
1979 556,240 546,449 443,659 46. 14 11,843
1980 684,930 672,440 550,327 46.46 14,475
1981 786,166 764,379 625,241 47.49 16,096
1982 846,136 819,760 670,207 48.49 16,906
1983 924,254 898,884 724,551 49.46 18,174
1984 991,752 960,405 767,165 50.40 19,056
Sources : 1. NESDB
2. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 
1968, 1975 and 1983
Note : GNP = GDP + net factor income payment from
the rest of the World
NNP = GNP - Indirect tax less subsidy
- Provision for the consumption of 
fixed capital
Table 1.5 GDP, GNP, and per capita GNP at 
constant 1972 prices
(millions of baht)
Year
Constant 
1972 prices
GDP GNP
Mid-year 
Population 
(millions) 
(baht)
Per
capita 
GNP 
(baht)
1960 70,139 68,192 26.39 2,584
1 961 73,856 71,802 27.21 2,639
1962 79,838 77,591 28.05 2,766
1963 86,544 84,153 28.92 2,910
1964 92,256 89,660 29.82 3,007
1965 99,544 96,789 30.74 3,149
1966 111,688 108,576 32.00 3,393
1967 120,389 114,612 33.00 3,473
1968 130,598 124,272 34.04 3,651
1969 140,941 136,677 35.11 4,007
1970 150,092 146,425 36.22 4,043
1971 157,088 157,927 37.38 4,225
1972 164,626 164,299 38.58 4,259
1973 180,146 179,751 39.69 4,529
1974 189,950 190,631 40.78 4,675
1975 203,514 203,339 41.87 4,856
1976 221,225 220,205 42.96 5, 126
1977 237,173 235,598 44.04 5,350
1978 261,097 257,043 45. 10 5,699
1979 276,907 269,897 46. 14 5,849
1980 292,852 284,573 46.46 6, 126
1981 311,270 298,284 47.49 6,281
1982 324,032 309, 122 48.49 6,375
1983 342,946 328,886 49.46 6,649
1984 363,563 346,515 50.40 6,875
Source : NESDB
Table 1.6 External Transactions and GNP in Current Prices
(Millions of Baht)
Year
1
Exports Imports X.+ M. GNP
1960 8,422 9,622 18,044 53,885
1961 9,717 10,287 20,004 58,877
1962 9,255 11,504 20,759 63,695
1963 9,420 12,803 22,223 68,038
1964 11,986 14,253 26,239 74,589
1965 12,641 16,185 28,826 84,292
1966 13,798 25,347 39,145 101,366
1967 13,798 22,187 35,985 108,462
1968 12,987 24,103 37,090 117,046
1969 14,101 26,891 40,992 128,792
1970 14,250 27,009 41,259 136,439
1971 16,683 26,794 43,477 144,637
1972 21,616 30,875 52,491 164,299
1973 31,146 42,184 73,330 216,119
1974 49,164 64,044 113,208 272,166
1975 47,504 66,835 114,339 298,597
1976 60,189 72,877 133,066 336,374
1977 70,398 94,177 164,575 391,016
1978 81,252 108,899 190,151 464,550
1979 106,336 146,161 252,497 546,449
1980 130,436 193,618 324,024 672,440
1981 148,962 219,026 367,988 764,379
1982 156,269 197,170 353,439 819,760
1983 142,086 217,417 359,503 898,884
Source : Department of Customs and NESDB 
1
domestic products only, not include re-exportsNote :
Table 1.7 Private Consumption Expenditure by
Commodity Group
(millions of baht)
1960 1970 1980 1984 
(est' d)
Food 26,314 44,822 67,210 78,816
Beverages 1,859 5,648 17,540 20,437
Tabacco 1,821 3,415 8, 161 8,595
Clothing & personal effects 3,907 8,847 17,935 20,803
Rent & water charges 2,931 4,357 6,777 8,678
Fuel & light 1,895 3,711 6,028 7,514
Furniture & household equip. 92 8 3,490 8,098 10,597
Household operation 939 2,206 4,041 4,893
Health expenses 2,778 5,691 14,347 20,347
Transp. & Communication 3,155 7,202 15,710 20,926
Recreation & Entertainment 3,256 8,134 21,114 25,936
Miscellaneous services 679 1,425 2,860 4,156
Priv. domestic consumption 50,462 98,948 189,821 231,698
Expenditure of residents
abroad 265 1,267 5,095 7,634
Less : Expenditure of non­
residents in the country -144 -2,237 -9,275 -14,717
Total 50,583 97,978 185,641 224,615
Source : NESDB
Table 1.8 Prices and Interest
Year
WPI
(1980 = 100,
CPI
period average)
Discount Rate 
(%)
(End of Period)
1960 27.8 31.5 5.0
1961 30. 1 33.9 5.0
1962 32.0 35.1 8.0
1963 30.0 35. 1 8. 0
1964 28.2 34.8 8.0
1965 29. 0 34.9 7.0
1966 33.2 36.3 7.0
1967 35.7 37.9 7.0
1968 34.0 38.6 7.0
1969 35.2 39.5 11.0
1970 35.0 39.5 9.0
1971 35. 1 39.6 9. 0
1972 37.8 41.6 8.0
1973 46.5 48.0 10.0
1974 60.0 59.7 11.0
1975 62.2 62.9 10.0
1976 64.6 65.5 9.0
1977 69.7 70.4 9.0
1978 74.9 76.0 12.5
1979 83.3 83.5 12.5
1980 100.0 100.0 13.5
1981 109.5 112.7 14.5
1982 110.5 118.6 12.5
1983 112.8 123.0 13.0
Source : Bank of Thailand, Quarterly bulletin 
various issues.
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Table II.2 Estimates of Factor Endowments, 1975 and 1980
(1) Capital (2) Labour (3) Land (4) Mineral
Stock force index
(billion of baht) (in millions) (millions ha)
1975 94.68 18.26 16.32 100
1980 159.40 22.73 17.72 164
Source : 1. Capital stock in 1975 is the estimate in the SIAM 2 
model (NESDB-IBRD, 1982) and the 1980 figure is 
obtained by assuming the same percentage change as 
the change in gross fixed capital formation (in 
constant prices) during the period (see Table II.3)
2. ADB, Key Indications of DMCs of ADB, April 1984, 
pp.300-3 01
3. calculated from OAE, Agricultural Statistics 
of Thailand, Crop Year 1983/84, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Co-Coperatives, Table 111. Land 
Utilization by Region, 1975-1982, pp.186-187 
(see Table II.4)
4. This is a proxy, calculated from the value added of 
mining sector's product at constant 1972 prices.
Due to a fall in the rising trend of the value of 
mineral products in 1975 c.f. 1974 and 1976 values, 
an adjustment is made and the above index actually 
represents the change from 1974-1980 which is the 
same as that from 1976-1980.
Table II.3 Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(millions of baht)
Gross Gross
fixed fixed
Year GDP Capital GDP Capital
Formation Formation
(current prices) % (1972 prices) %
1960 53,984 7,555 (14.0) 70,139 10,772 (15.4)
1961 58,970 8,315 (14. 1 ) 73,856 11,472 (15.5)
1962 63,793 10,093 (15.8) 79,838 13,640 (17.1 )
1963 68,079 12,085 (17.8) 86,544 16,245 (18.8)
1964 74,667 14,519 (19.4) 92,256 19,916 (21.6)
1965 84,303 15,986 (19.0) 99,544 21,649 (21.7)
1966 101,375 20,364 (20.1 ) 111,688 26,455 (23.7)
1967 108,294 24,927 (23.0) 120,389 32,508 (27.0 )
1968 116,774 27,477 (23.5 ) 130,598 35,405 (27.1 )
1969 128,566 30,744 (23.9) 140,941 39,809 (28.2)
1970 136,060 32,726 (24.1 ) 150,092 39,951 (26.6)
1971 144,607 32,772 (22.7) 157,088 39,335 (25.0 )
1972 164,626 34,607 (21.0 ) 164,626 34,607 (21.0 )
1973 216,543 44,244 (20.4) 180,146 37,904 (21.0)
1974 271,368 59,109 (21.8) 189,950 42,140 (22.2)
1975 298,816 66, 128 (22.1 ) 203,514 42,411 (20.8)
1976 337,635 73,272 (21.7) 221,225 45,119 (20.4 )
1977 393,030 98,632 (25. 1 ) 237,173 59,832 (25.2)
1978 469,952 116,650 (24.8) 261,097 64,184 (24.6)
1979 556,240 144,356 (26.0) 276,907 69,225 (25.0 )
1980 684,930 177,099 (25.9) 292,852 71,432 (24.4)
1981 786,166 189,067 (24.0) 311,270 72,556 (23.3)
1982 846,136 179,898 (21.3) 324,032 64,732 (20.0 )
1983 924,254 205,992 (22.3) 342,946 71,649 (20.9)
1984 991,752 223,492 (22.5) 363,563 72,631 (20.0 )
Source : NESDB
Note : figures in parentheses are expressed as the 
percentage of GDP
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Table II.4 Land Holding for Agriculture
(millions ha.)
Year
Housing Paddy 
area land
Other
crops
land
Grass
land
Idle
land Others
Total
farm
land
1960 6.21 2.05 0.84 10.02
1961 6.30 2.35 0.85 10.56
1962 6. 37 2.58 0.81 11.04
1963 6.45 2.87 0.80 11.13
1964 6.54 3. 17 0.79 12. 19
1965 6.65 3.53 0.79 12.78
1966 n. a . 7.01 3.58 n.a. 0.74 13. 14
1967 7.49 3.58 0.71 13.53
1968 8.05 3.61 0.69 13.98
1969 8.68 3.66 0.67 14.49
1970 9. 39 3.71 0.66 15.08
1971 .42 10.16 3.81 0.65 15.90
1972 .41 10.48 4.09 0.62 16.57
1973 .41 10.75 4.49 0.60 17.50
1974 .41 10.89 4.64 0.54 17.67
1975 .45 11.40 4. 92 0.08 0.73 0.38 17.95
1976 .44 11.41 5. 12 0.07 0.66 0.41 18. 10
1 977 . 43 11.44 5.40 0.05 0.50 0.39 18.21
1978 .42 11.72 5.53 0.06 0.47 0.44 18.63
1979 .40 11.66 5.86 0.08 0.48 0.34 18. 82
1980 .40 11.77 5.95 0.08 0.49 0.34 19.04
1981 .40 11.76 6.26 0. 12 0.54 0.33 19.41
1982 .41 11.72 6.64 0. 12 0.62 0.26 19.77
Source : Office of Agricultural Economics , Bangkok
Note : break in series from 1975 because estimates 
of earlier years have not been revised in 
accordance with more recent data
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APPENDIX III
Sector Sector Correspondence with Codes in Basic
No. Input-Output Table of Thailand 1975
1 Crops Paddy 001, Maize 002, other Cereals
003, Casava 004, Other Root Crops,
Beans and Nuts 006, Vegetables 007, 
Fruits 008, Sugar Cane 009, Coconut 
010, Oil Palm 011, Kenaf & Jute 012, 
Other Crops for Textile & Matings 013, 
Tobacco 014, Cofee & Tea 015, Rubber 
016, Other Agricultural Products 017, 
Rice Milling 049, Topioca Milling 050, 
Maize Milling 051, Flour and Other Grain 
milling 052, Sugar 055, Tobacco 
Processing 065, Tobacco Products 066, 
Rubber Sheets & Block Rubber 095
2 Other Agriculture Cattle & Buffalo 018, Swine 019, Other
Livestock 020, Poultry Products 022, 
Silkworm 023, Agriculture Services 024, 
Logging 025, Other Forest Products 027, 
Ocean & Coastal Fishing 028, Inland 
Fishing 029
3 Minerals & Energy Charcoal & Firewood 026, Coal & Lignite
030, Petroleum & Natural Gas 031,
Iron Ore 032, Tin Ore 033, Tugnsten Ore 
034, Other Non-Ferrous Metal Ore 035, 
Fluorite 036, Chemical Fertilizer 037, 
Salt 038, Limestone 039, Stone 
Quarrying 040, Other Mining & 
Quarrying 041, Non Ferrous Metal 107,
4 Light Industry Slaughtering 042, Canning & Preserva­
tion of Meat 043, Dairy Products 044, 
Canning & Preservation of Vegetables 
045, Canning & Preservation of Fish 
& Other Sea Foods 046, Coconut & Palm 
Oil 047, Animal Oil, Animal Fat, 
Vegetable Oil & By Products 048,
Bakery Products 053, Noodles & Similar 
Products 054, Confectionary 056, Ice 
057, Monosodium Glutamate 058, Coffee 
& Tea 059, Other Food Products 060, 
Animal Feed 061, Distilling & Spitits
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Blending 062, Breweries 063, Soft 
Drinks & Carbonated Water 064, Spinning 
067, Weaving 068, Textile Bleaching & 
Finishing 069, Made Up Textile Goods 
070, Knitting 071, Wearing Apparel 072, 
Carpets & Rugs 073, Jute Mill Products 
074, Tanneries & Leather Finishing 075, 
Leather Products 076, Footwear, Except 
of Rubber 077, Sawmills 078, Wood &
Cork Products 079, Wood Furniture & 
Fixtures 080, Pulp, Paper & Paper-board 
081, Paper & Paper-board Products 082, 
Printing & Publishing 083, Basic Indus­
trial Chemicals 084, Fertilizers & 
Pesticides 085, Synthetic Resins, 
Plastics & Artificial Fiber Material, 
Excluding Glass 086, Paints, Varnishes 
& Lequers 087, Drugs & Medicines 088, 
Soap & Cleaning Preparations 089, 
Cosmetics 090, Matches 091, Other 
Chemical Products 092, Tyres & Tubes 
096, Other Rubber Products 097, Plastic 
Ware 098, Ceramics & Earthware 099, 
Glass & Glass Products 100, Structural 
Clay Products 101, Cement 102,
Concrete & Cement Products 103, Other 
Non-Metallic Products 104, Scientific 
Equipment 129, Photographic & Clocks 
131, Jewelry & Related Articles 132, 
Recreational & Athletic Equipment 133, 
Other Manufactured Goods 134
5 Heavy Industry Petroleum Refineries 093, Other
Petroleum Products 094, Secondary 
Steel 105, Iron & Steel Products 106, 
Cutlery & Hand Tools 108, Metal 
Furnitures & Fixtures 109, Structural 
Metal Products 111, Engines & Turbines 
112, Agricultural Machinery 113, Wood 
& Metal Working Machines 114, Special 
Industrial Machinery 115, Office & 
Household Machinery & Appliances 116, 
Electrical Industrial Machinery & 
Appliances 117, Radio, Television & 
Communication Equipment and Apparatus
118, Household Electrical Appliances
119, Insulated Wire & Cable 120, 
Electric Accumulators & Batteries 121, 
Other Electrical Aparatus & Supplies 
122, Ship Building & Repairing 123, 
Railroad Equipment 124, Motor Vehicles 
125, Motorcycles & Bicycles 126,
Repair of Vehicles 127, Aircraft 128
6 Services Electricity 135, Gas 136, Water Works
& Supplies 137, Residential Building 
Construction 138, Non-Residential 
Building & Construction 139, Public 
Works for Agriculture & Forestry 140,
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C o n s t r u c t i o n  & E l e c t r i c  P l a n t s  142, 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  & C o m m u n ica t io n  F a c i l i t i e s  
143, O th e r  C o n s t r u c t i o n  144, W h o le s a le  
T r a d e  145, R e t a i l  T r a d e  146, R e s t a u r a n t s  
& D r i n k i n g  P l a c e s  147 , H o t e l s  & P l a c e s  
o f  L o d g in g  1 4 8 ,  R a i lw a y s  149, Road 
P a s s e n g e r  T r a n s p o r t  150 , Road F r e i g h t  
T r a n s p o r t  151, Land T r a n s p o r t  S e r v i c e s  
152, Ocean T r a n s p o r t  153 , C o a s t a l  & 
I n l a n d  W a te r  T r a n s p o r t  154, W a te r  
T r a n s p o r t  S e r v i c e s  155 , A i r  T r a n s p o r t  
156, O th e r  S e r v i c e s  157, S t o r a g e  & 
W a re h o u s in g  158 , P o s t  & T e le c o m m u n ic a ­
t i o n s  159, B a n k in g  S e r v i c e s  160, L i f e  
I n s u r a n c e  S e r v i c e s  161 , O th e r  I n s u r a n c e  
S e r v i c e s  162, R ea l  E s t a t e  163, B u s i n e s s  
S e r v i c e s  164 , A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  165 , S a n i ­
t a r y  & S i m i l a r  S e r v i c e s  166, E d u c a t i o n  
167, R e s e a r c h  168, H o s p i t a l s  16 9 , 
B u s i n e s s  & L a b o u r  A s s o c i a t i o n s  170,
O th e r  Community S e r v i c e s  171 , M o tio n  
P i c t u r e  P r o d u c t i o n  172, M ovie T h e a t r e s  
173, R a d io ,  T e l e v i s i o n  an d  R e l a t e d  
S e r v i c e s  174 , Amusement an d  R e c r e a t i o n
176, R e p a i r s  N ot E l s e w h e r e  C l a s s i f i e d
177 , P e r s o n a l  S e r v i c e s  178, O th e r  
S e r v i c e s  N ot E l s e w h e r e  C l a s s i f i e d  179
Ä
